On November 13, 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a coordinated, high-volume phishing campaign targeting organizations across multiple sectors worldwide. The threat actors used phishing emails disguised as legitimate Microsoft 365 service-health notifications to lure recipients into clicking a malicious link. The messages created a false sense of urgency by claiming that emails had been held during a service disruption and would be deleted within 24 hours unless the recipient took action to restore them. This is consistent with historical attacker campaigns which continuously look for notable global events to exploit in their social engineering lures.
Microsoft identified the threat actor’s use of specific sender domain names, randomized outage subjects, recipient-specific tracking links, and a common non-Microsoft destination to make the messages appear relevant while complicating simple pattern matching. We assess that the activity was likely credential phishing; however, the available evidence does not confirm credential capture, malware delivery, or post-compromise activity. Multiple threat actors may continue to look for ways to exploit notable global events in any social engineering pretext.
If credentials were entered, organizations should consider the risk of account compromise, mailbox access, business email compromise, internal phishing, inbox-rule manipulation, and access to cloud collaboration data. Microsoft Defender blocks malicious domains used in this campaign, and Microsoft Defender for Office 365 blocks and quarantines phishing emails. We will continue to monitor this campaign and other related threats. Security teams can use Microsoft Defender for Office 365 and Microsoft Defender XDR capabilities to investigate messages, URLs, clicks, and potential follow-on activity.
Microsoft analyzed the email lures sent on November 13, 2026: the emails used the subject pattern “Outage – <random token>” and display names built from a three-character, organization-style prefix followed by “Outage Notification” or “Service Health.”
Example subject line:
Example display names:
One example email body referenced a purported Exchange Online incident on November 12 and claimed that four messages were held after the outage. The urgency of a 24-hour deletion deadline and the prominent “RESTORE MESSAGES” call to action were intended to drive immediate interaction.
The activity used distinct sender domains, including: moments-notice[.]com, planetmaison[.]com and newbooker[.]com. The messages also used email-delivery and link-tracking infrastructure to generate recipient-specific URLs. In multiple samples, click-tracking links led to reallifeaccounting[.]com or reallifeaccounting[.]com/themelist0.html.
The sample set was link-based: no QR codes or non-EML attachments were observed, and Microsoft did not identify evidence of executable, archive, document, or other malware payload delivery. The off-brand destination and Microsoft 365 impersonation support an assessment of likely credential phishing, but the available evidence did not include the final page source, credential fields, credential-submission telemetry, or post-compromise activity. Microsoft therefore has not attributed the campaign to a named threat actor or malware family.


Messages in environments protected by Microsoft Defender for Office are currently blocked/quarantined, and we have not observed any indicators of compromise from this attack.
However, organizations can consider taking the following steps:
Security Copilot customers can use the standalone experience to create their own prompts or run the following prebuilt promptbooks to automate incident response or investigation tasks related to this threat:
Note that some promptbooks require access to plugins for Microsoft products such as Microsoft Defender XDR or Microsoft Sentinel.
High volume phishing campaign uses Microsoft 365 Outage lures to target multiple industry sectors.
These sample queries search for campaign characteristics in Microsoft Defender XDR. Review the results in the context of your environment and adjust the indicators only after validation. The queries do not set a time range; use the advanced hunting time selector for the period you want to investigate.
Find messages by sender domain or subject pattern
This query searches for the observed sender-domain clusters and the randomized outage subject pattern.
let campaignDomains = dynamic([
"moments-notice.com",
"em4493.moments-notice.com",
"newbooker.com",
"em.newbooker.com"
]);
EmailEvents
| where SenderFromDomain in~ (campaignDomains)
or Subject matches regex
@"(?i)^(?:\[external\]\s*|\*external\*\s*)?outage\s*-\s*[a-z0-9]{6}$"
| project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, SenderDisplayName,
Subject, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation
| order by Timestamp desc
Find messages containing campaign URLs
This query identifies message URLs that contain the observed destination, click-tracking hosts, or tracking-pixel pattern, and joins the results to message metadata.
let campaignUrlParts = dynamic([
"reallifeaccounting.com",
"u113727626.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click",
"url.newbooker.com/ls/click",
"162.120.17.69:8080/t/v3."
]);
EmailUrlInfo
| where Url has_any (campaignUrlParts)
| project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain, UrlLocation
| join kind=inner (
EmailEvents
| project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, SenderDisplayName,
Subject, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation
) on NetworkMessageId
| project Timestamp, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
SenderFromDomain, SenderDisplayName, Subject, Url, UrlDomain,
UrlLocation, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation, NetworkMessageId
| order by Timestamp desc
Investigate user clicks on campaign URLs
This query searches click telemetry for the observed destination and tracking patterns so investigators can identify affected users and determine whether clicks were allowed.
let campaignUrlParts = dynamic([
"reallifeaccounting.com",
"u113727626.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click",
"url.newbooker.com/ls/click",
"162.120.17.69:8080/t/v3."
]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (campaignUrlParts)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, Workload,
NetworkMessageId, IPAddress, IsClickedThrough, UrlChain
| order by Timestamp desc
For users who interacted with campaign links, also investigate:
These behaviors were not observed in the source messages, they are post-click investigation targets for suspected Microsoft 365 credential phishing.
The activity exhibited the following techniques. Microsoft did not map credential capture, malware execution, command and control, or data exfiltration because the available evidence did not directly demonstrate those actions.
Initial Access
Defense Evasion
Execution
The following defanged indicators were observed in the campaign and should be validated in the context of each environment before blocking. Shared service-provider infrastructure can generate false positives when used without the accompanying sender, content, and behavioral signals.
| Indicator | Type | Context | |
| moments-notice[.]com | Domain | Observed sender-domain cluster. | |
| planetmaison[.]com | Domain | Observed sender-domain cluster. | |
| em4493[.]moments-notice[.]com | Domain | Observed mail-from or bounce subdomain. | |
| newbooker[.]com | Domain | Observed sender-domain cluster. | |
| em[.]newbooker[.]com | Domain | Observed mail-from or bounce subdomain. | |
| url[.]newbooker[.]com | Domain | Observed click/open tracking host. | |
| url7489[.]newbooker[.]com | Domain | Observed click/open tracking host. | |
| u113727626[.]ct[.]sendgrid[.]net | Domain | Observed click/open tracking host; assess with campaign context because the parent service can be shared. | |
| u118254266[.]ct[.]sendgrid[.]net | Domain | Observed click/open tracking host; assess with campaign context because the parent service can be shared. | |
| u118250677[.]ct[.]sendgrid[.]net | Domain | Observed click/open tracking host; assess with campaign context because the parent service can be shared. | |
| reallifeaccounting[.]com | Domain | Principal downstream destination observed in multiple messages. | |
| outagefixed[.]sbs | Domain | Downstream destination observed in some messages. | |
| outagerestored[.]sbs | Domain | Downstream destination observed in some messages. | |
| hxxps://reallifeaccounting[.]com/themelist0[.]html | URL | Observed destination path. | |
| hxxps://outagerestored[.]sbs/topics_pxyk/themelist0[.]html | URL | Observed destination path. | |
| 162[.]120[.]17[.]69:8080 | IP and port | Observed host for individualized /t/v3…/px[.]png resources. | |
| Outage – <random> | Subject pattern | Observed randomized subject format; external-mail tags may precede it. | |
| Strengthen – Security <random> | Subject pattern | Observed randomized subject format; external-mail tags may precede it. | |
| Restore — 4 messages <random> | Subject pattern | Observed randomized subject format; external-mail tags may precede it. | |
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