
New releaseAug 22, 2026
Static credential scanner that detects and redacts hardcoded secrets in source code, replacing them with safe sentinels or environment variable references for CI/CD pipelines.
Find the secret. Fix it. Commit clean.
Secret scanners are good at sounding the alarm and not much help putting it out. They hand you a list of leaked credentials and leave the cleanup to you. Credactor closes the loop: it finds a hardcoded secret and rewrites it in place, so a leak goes from detection to fix in a single command.
Keeping credentials out of source code is a baseline security practice, not an optional one. Credactor makes that baseline cheap to hold, on your machine before a commit or in CI before a merge. Run it on its own, or alongside the scanners you already trust.

# Credactor finds this:
db_password = "h8Tq2vKp9mRz4Wd"
# By default it rewrites the secret as a sentinel that fails loudly at runtime:
db_password = "REDACTED_BY_CREDACTOR"
# With --replace-with env, it writes a reference that reads from the environment:
db_password = os.environ["DB_PASSWORD"]
Redaction rewrites files in your working tree. If a secret has already been committed, rotate the key and scrub history as well (for example, with
git filter-repo). Rewriting a file is not a substitute for revoking a leaked credential.
REDACTED_BY_CREDACTOR sentinel that fails at runtime by default, or a language-aware environment-variable reference (Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, Java/Kotlin, Ruby, PHP, and shell) such as os.environ["KEY"]. The replacement is valid code. If the file does not already include the matching import (for example import os), add it..bak backups, symlink-boundary and file-permission guards, and full-secret masking in every output. If a safe backup cannot be written, Credactor skips the file rather than rewrite it blind, and a crash mid-write leaves the original intact.--ci gate with precise exit codes, a pre-commit hook (beta), and ingestion of Gitleaks or TruffleHog reports (BETA, with more on the way). Detect with Gitleaks or TruffleHog, remediate with Credactor.Requires Python 3.11+. No other dependencies. Runs on Linux, macOS, and Windows (CI-tested on Linux and Windows).
From source:
git clone https://github.com/rxb06/credactor.git
cd credactor
pip install -e .
credactor then works from any directory.
Run
--dry-runfirst and review the findings before redacting. False positives are possible, and under--fix-alla false positive gets rewritten. Suppress known-safe values with# credactor:ignoreor a.credactorignoreentry.
credactor --dry-run . # scan, change nothing
credactor . # scan, then redact interactively (y/n per finding)
credactor --fix-all . # redact everything after one confirmation
credactor --fix-all --yes . # redact non-interactively (CI / scripts)
credactor --ci . # read-only gate: exit 1 on findings
credactor --replace-with env . # redact to env-var references instead of the sentinel
Hook integration is in beta. Run
credactor --dry-run .manually before relying on it alone.
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/rxb06/credactor
rev: v2.5.0 # pin to the latest release tag
hooks:
- id: credactor
Credactor detects the credential types that leak most often, and assigns each a severity so you can triage at a glance.
| Category | Examples | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| Cloud provider keys | AWS (AKIA…), GCP (AIza…), Stripe (sk_live_…), Slack (xoxb-…) | Critical |
| Platform tokens | GitHub (ghp_, github_pat_), GitLab (glpat-), npm (npm_), PyPI (pypi-) | Critical |
| Private keys | PEM blocks (-----BEGIN … PRIVATE KEY-----) | Critical |
| JWTs | eyJ… three-segment tokens | High |
| Connection strings | URLs with inline credentials (scheme://user:pass@host) | High |
| Credential variables | password = "…", api_key = "…", secret_key = "…" | High/Medium/Low |
| XML attributes | <add key="Password" value="…" /> | High/Medium/Low |
| High-entropy strings | quoted hex (32–64 chars) / Base64 (60+ chars) | Medium/Low |
Deterministic provider tokens (the prefixes above) are flagged regardless of entropy. Heuristic detectors (JWTs, connection strings, hex, Base64) must clear an entropy floor. Standalone hex or Base64 is flagged only when quoted. An unquoted high-entropy value is caught only on a credential-named variable, which spares git SHAs and checksums. For the full detection and severity rules, see the Manual.
Credactor's native rule set is narrower than a dedicated scanner's, and some provider formats (for example SendGrid, Twilio, and Slack webhooks) are not detected. Its edge is remediation: pair it with Gitleaks or TruffleHog for the broadest detection, or run it on its own.
Credactor stands on its own, and it gets stronger in company. Already run Gitleaks or TruffleHog? Pass their report to Credactor and it redacts the combined set, deduplicated against its own findings (on overlap, the higher severity wins). One remediation pass covers your scan and theirs:
gitleaks dir . -f json -r gitleaks.json
credactor --from-gitleaks gitleaks.json --fix-all --yes .
--from-gitleaks / --from-trufflehog (or an [ingest] table in .credactor.toml) require a directory target. See the CI Integration guide.
--replacement; --scan-history to scan git commit history--secure-delete (overwrite and remove the .bak; raises the bar against casual recovery, not a forensic guarantee) or --secure-backup-dir to store backups outside the repo# credactor:ignore and .credactorignore allowlists (globs, file:line, value literals).credactor.toml.txt included); --scan-json to include JSON; --fail-on-error to fail when a file cannot be read
.py.js.ts.jsx.tsx.sh.bash.env.cfg.ini.toml.yaml.yml.rb.go.java.php.cs.kt.tf.hcl.conf.config.properties.xml.pem.key.crt.txt
Plus .env.* / .env-* variants (.env.local, .env.production) and SSH / private-key files (id_rsa, id_dsa, id_ecdsa, id_ed25519), all matched by filename rather than extension. JSON is excluded by default because API responses produce a high false-positive rate; add --scan-json to include it. A file named directly on the command line is scanned even if its extension is not in this list.
| Code | Meaning |
|---|---|
0 | No findings, or all resolved |
1 | Unresolved findings |
2 | Error (for example: bad path, dangerous --replacement, --ci --fix-all, or --fail-on-error with an unreadable file) |
A security tool should be safe to install, not only safe to run. Credactor's build and release pipeline is hardened end to end; full detail in the Security doc.
pip install credactor pulls in no third-party packages (only the optional [encoding] extra), so there is nothing to vet at install time.--require-hashes lockfile, build backend included (python -m build --no-isolation against a pinned setuptools), so a tampered dependency fails the build.scripts/audit_wheel.py compares the wheel and sdist to the committed source byte for byte (sha256 vs git HEAD); any added, missing, or altered file fails the gate, so a build step cannot inject code unnoticed.contents: read by default, id-token: write only for the publish job.| Document | Description |
|---|---|
| Setup Guide | Installation, configuration, CI/CD integration |
| Manual | Complete reference: every flag, mode, and combination, replacement and backup behaviour, detection and severity, exit codes, and limitations (behaviour test-verified) |
| Examples | Common workflows with output |
| CI Integration | Pre-commit hooks, CI pipelines |
| Security | Threat model, hardening measures, known limitations |
| Changelog | Version history |
| Contributing | Development setup, code style, PR process |
| Disclaimer | Limitations, safe usage, warranty |
Apache 2.0. See LICENSE.