Lumma Stealer infection with Sectop RAT (ArechClient2), (Fri, Apr 17th)
嗯,用户让我帮他总结一篇文章的内容,控制在一百个字以内,而且不需要用“文章内容总结”之类的开头。直接写描述就行。好的,我先看看这篇文章讲的是什么。 文章看起来是关于一起恶意软件感染事件的日记。首先,作者下载了一个叫做Lumma Stealer的恶意软件,然后被Sectop RAT(ArechClient2)感染了。作者是通过搜索破解版的受版权保护软件下载的初始恶意软件,这很常见。 初始恶意软件是一个密码保护的7-zip压缩包,提取后是一个膨胀到806MB的Windows可执行文件。这个EXE文件填充了空字节,用来混淆视听,避免被检测到。 文章还提到了一些指标,比如下载链接、文件哈希值、命令和控制服务器域名等等。最后还提到了后续恶意软件Sectop RAT的相关信息。 用户的需求是用中文总结内容,控制在100字以内。所以我要抓住关键点:Lumma Stealer和Sectop RAT的感染过程、通过破解软件传播、7-zip压缩包和膨胀EXE的特点、C2域名和后续恶意软件的信息。 现在把这些点浓缩成一句话:描述了一起Lumma Stealer感染事件及其后续Sectop RAT活动,包括传播方式、恶意软件特征及C2通信等信息。 检查一下字数,刚好在100字以内。这样应该符合用户的要求了。 </think> 描述了一起Lumma Stealer感染事件及其后续Sectop RAT活动,包括传播方式、恶意软件特征及C2通信等信息。 2026-4-17 00:30:27 Author: isc.sans.edu(查看原文) 阅读量:11 收藏

Introduction

This diary provides indicators from a Lumma Stealer infection that was followed by Sectop RAT (ArechClient2). I searched for cracked versions of popular copyright-protected software, and I downloaded the initial malware after following the results of one such search. This is a common distribution technique for various families of malware, and I often find Lumma Stealer this way.

In this case, the initial malware for Lumma Stealer was delivered as a password-protected 7-zip archive. The extracted malware is an inflated Windows executable (EXE) file at 806 MB. The EXE is padded with null-bytes (0x00), a technical which increases the EXE size while allowing the compressed archive file to be much smaller. The password-protected archive and inflated EXE file are designed to avoid detection.

Images from the infection


Shown above: Example of a page with instructions to download the initial malware file.


Shown above: Traffic from the infection filtered in Wireshark.


Shown above: Sectop RAT persistent on an infected Windows host.

Indicators of Compromise

Example of download link from the site advertising cracked versions of copyright-protected software:

hxxps[:]//incolorand[.]com/how-visual-patch-enhances-ui-consistency-across-releases/?utm_source={CID}&utm_term=Adobe%20Premiere%20Pro%20(2026)%20Full%20v26.0.2%20Espa%C3%B1ol%20[Mega]&utm_content={SUBID1}&utm_medium={SUBID2}

Example of URL for page with the file download instructions:

hxxps[:]//mega-nz.goldeneagletransport[.]com/Adobe_Premiere_Pro_%282026%29_Full_v26.0.2_Espa%C3%B1ol_%5BMega%5D.zip?c=ABUZ4WkRgQUA_YUCAFVTFwASAAAAAACh&s=360721

Example of URL for file download from site above site impersonating MEGA:

hxxps[:]//arch.primedatahost3[.]cfd/auth/media/JvWcFd5vUoYTrImvtWQAASTh/Adobe_Premiere_Pro_(2026)_Full_v26.0.2_Espa%C3%B1ol_%5BMega%5D.zip

Downloaded file:

Extracted malware:

  • SHA256 hash: 4849f76dafbef516df91fecfc23a72afffaf77ade51f805eae5ad552bed88923
  • File size: 806,127,604 bytes
  • File name: appFile.exe
  • File type: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
  • File description: Inflated Windows EXE file for Lumma Stealer, padded with null-bytes

Deflated malware:

Lumma Stealer command and control (C2) domains from Triage sandbox analysis:

  • cankgmr[.]cyou
  • carytui[.]vu
  • decrnoj[.]club
  • genugsq[.]best
  • longmbx[.]click
  • mushxhb[.]best
  • pomflgf[.]vu
  • strikql[.]shop
  • ulmudhw[.]shop

Follow-up malware:

Example of Sectop RAT C2 traffic from an infected Windows host:

  • hxxp[:]//91.92.241[.]102:9000/wmglb
  • hxxp[:]//91.92.241[.]102:9000/wbinjget?q=66B553A8B94CE37C16F4EBC863D51FCC
  • tcp[:]//91.92.241[.]102:443/ - encoded or otherwise encrypted traffic (not HTTPS/TLS)

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Bradley Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net


文章来源: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/32904
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