Author here. DVRTC is our attempt to fill a gap that's been there for a while: web app security has DVWA and friends, but there's been nothing equivalent for VoIP and WebRTC attack techniques.
The first scenario (pbx1) deploys a full stack — Kamailio as the SIP proxy, Asterisk as the back-end PBX, rtpengine for media, coturn for TURN/STUN — with each component configured to exhibit specific vulnerable behaviors:
Kamailio returns distinguishable responses for valid vs. invalid extensions (enumeration), logs User-Agent headers to MySQL without sanitisation (SQLi), and has a special handler that triggers digest auth leaks for extension 2000
rtpengine is using default configuration, that enables RTP bleed (leaking media from other sessions) and RTP injection
coturn uses hardcoded credentials and a permissive relay policy for the TURN abuse exercise
Asterisk has extension 1000 with a weak password (1500) for online cracking
7 exercises with step-by-step instructions. There's also a live instance at pbx1.dvrtc.net if you want to try it without standing up your own.
Happy to answer questions.