Security in the Age of Agents
嗯,用户让我总结一篇文章,控制在100字以内,而且不需要特定的开头。首先,我需要理解文章内容。文章讲的是一个安全研究人员Joel Eriksson分析了一个自称安全的AI代理操作系统OpenFang,结果发现它有很多安全漏洞,比如沙盒机制容易绕过,加密协议有缺陷,审计日志不持久等等。最后指出虽然AI代理很重要,但安全防护是关键。 接下来,我得把这些要点浓缩到100字以内。要涵盖OpenFang声称的安全特性、实际存在的漏洞类型、以及作者的观点。同时,语言要简洁明了。 可能的结构:先点明主题,然后列举主要问题,最后提到作者的观点。比如:“研究人员分析了声称安全的AI代理操作系统OpenFang,发现其存在多重漏洞:沙盒机制易被绕过、加密协议缺陷、审计日志不持久等。尽管AI代理重要,但安全防护仍需加强。” 检查一下字数是否在限制内,并确保没有使用禁止的开头方式。 </think> 研究人员分析了声称安全的AI代理操作系统OpenFang,发现其存在多重漏洞:沙盒机制易被绕过、加密协议缺陷、审计日志不持久等。尽管AI代理重要,但安全防护仍需加强。 2026-3-8 13:26:52 Author: clevcode.org(查看原文) 阅读量:10 收藏

Joel Eriksson

Vulnerability researcher, exploit developer and reverse-engineer. Have spoken at BlackHat, DefCon and the RSA conference. CTF player. Puzzle solver (Cicada 3301, Boxen)

So many AI agent orchestration frameworks and “operating systems” are being released right now, that claim to be built with security in mind – proudly listing their extensive security features, related to everything from their use of cryptography to sandboxes and memory-safe languages.

Then once you take a peek inside, the castle made of sand generally crumbles down fast.

Here we will take a look at one of them, a self-proclaimed Agent Operating System, named OpenFang

As is often the case, it sounds like security is a priority and that they’ve really thought about security from the ground up. It sounds quite promising, as long as you don’t bother to take a peek under the surface. 16 security systems, sandboxed execution, Merkle audit trail and taint tracking etc.

When taking a closer look, the “taint tracking” used to enforce an allowlist of commands for agents could be trivially bypassed in at least four different ways (command-splitting on |, ;, && and || but a whitelisted command followed by & cmd, `cmd`, $(cmd) and <newline>cmd works fine. Overall, they’re fighting a losing game by implementing a command line parsing based sandbox rather than using an actual sandbox (using seccomp-bpf, for instance), a container or a microVM.

As for the AES-256-GCM based auth in the OpenFang P2P protocol, well, besides being vulnerable to a replay attack, the protocol itself is completely in plaintext after the handshake!

Regarding the “WASM sandboxes”, turns out they aren’t actually used for anything, there’s not a single WASM agent in the repo, and since rather than conforming to WASI they require implementing a completely custom API, it’s unlikely that anyone would bother making a WASM based agent in the first place (not even the maintainers do, so).

And as for the “Merkle audit trail”, that audit trail is stored entirely in-memory, so simply restarting the daemon is enough to erase any traces of that trail.

Last but not least, it turns out that even their API key based authentication could be trivially bypassed, so anyone with access to the dashboard URL can get remote code execution. That’s the part I demonstrate in the video at the top, so enjoy. ;)

Note that I’m not against the idea of using AI agents. On the contrary, I think that it will become increasingly important for people to leverage the power of AI to accelerate themselves.

Being able to do so in a way that actually limits the risk and blast radius of any attack is a difficult problem though, which is why it’s one of the things I’m focusing heavily on right now…

To get notified when I start releasing some of the things I do within that space in the future, make sure to register at GRAFIT


文章来源: https://clevcode.org/security-in-the-age-of-agents/
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