Fake Fedex Email Delivers Donuts!, (Fri, Feb 27th)
嗯,用户让我总结一下这篇文章的内容,控制在100字以内,而且不需要特定的开头。首先,我需要快速浏览文章内容,抓住主要点。 文章讲的是一个周五发现的恶意软件案例。用户收到FedEx的通知邮件,结果是一个钓鱼攻击。附件是一个7z压缩包,里面包含了一个.bat脚本。这个脚本生成环境变量,并通过Run键实现持久化。它使用了延迟扩展变量,这可能用来绕过一些检测工具。 然后,脚本运行了一个Base64编码的PowerShell脚本。这个脚本创建了一个互斥体(Mutex),可能用于防止重复运行或调试。接着解密了一个AES加密的payload,注入到explorer进程里,启动新的线程。最终连接到C2服务器,属于XWorm家族。 总结的时候要注意控制字数,所以需要提炼关键点:FedEx钓鱼邮件、7z附件、bat脚本、持久化、PowerShell解密、注入shellcode、XWorm。 现在把这些点连贯地组织起来,确保在100字以内。 </think> 这篇文章描述了一种通过FedEx通知邮件传播的恶意软件案例。攻击者通过伪装成 FedEx 的通知邮件发送包含恶意脚本的压缩包(fedex_shipping_document.7z)。该脚本生成环境变量并实现持久化,随后通过 PowerShell 解密并执行 AES 加密的恶意负载。最终,该恶意软件注入 shellcode 到 explorer 进程中,并连接到 C2 服务器(204.10.160.190:7003),属于 XWorm 家族。 2026-2-27 12:22:12 Author: isc.sans.edu(查看原文) 阅读量:8 收藏

It’s Friday, let’s have a look at another simple piece of malware to close a busy week! I received a Fedex notification about a delivery. Usually, such emails are simple phishing attacks that redirect you to a fake login page to collect your credentials. Here, it was a bit different:

Nothing really fancy but it is effective and uses interesting techniques. The attached archive called "fedex_shipping_document.7z" (SHA256: a02d54db4ecd6a02f886b522ee78221406aa9a50b92d30b06efb86b9a15781f5 ) contains a Windows script (.bat file) with the same filename. This script, not really obfuscated and easy to understand, receiveds a low VT score, only 12/61!

First, il will generate some environment variables and implement persistence through a Run key:

The variable name "!contract" contains the path of a script copy in %APPDATA%\Rail\EXPRESSIO.cmd. The threat actor does not use the classic environment variable format “%VAR%” but “!var!”. This is expanded at execution time, meaning it reflects the current value inside loops and blocks[1]. It’s enabled via this command

setlocal enableDelayedExpansion

Simple but nice trick to defeat simple search of "%..%"!

Then a PowerShell one-liner is invoked. The Powershell payload is located in the script (at the end) and Bas64-encoded. A nice trick is that the very first characters of the Base64 payload makes it undetectable by tools like base64dump! PowerShell extracts it through a regular expression:

Once the payload decoded, it is piped to another PowerShell:

The PowerShell implements different behaviors. First, it will create a Mutex on the victim’s computer:

Strange, it seems that some anti-debugging and anti-sandoxing are not completely implemented. By example, the scripts gets the number of CPU cores (a classic) but it’s never tested!

The script waits for the presence of an « explorer » process (which means that a user is logged in) otherwise it exists:

There is a long Base64-encoded variable that contains a payload that has been AES encrypted. The IV and salt are extracted and the payload decrypted. No time to loose, run the script into the Powershell debugger and dump the decrypted data in a file:

The decrypted data is the next stage: a shellcode. This one will be injected into the explorer process and a new thread started:

This behavior is typical to DonutLoader[2].

The shell code connects to the C2 server: 204[.]10[.]160[.]190:7003. It's a good old XWorm!

[1] https://ss64.com/nt/delayedexpansion.html
[2] https://medium.com/@anyrun/donutloader-malware-overview-00d9e3d79a48

Xavier Mertens (@xme)
Xameco
Senior ISC Handler - Freelance Cyber Security Consultant
PGP Key


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