Researchers Show Copilot and Grok Can Be Abused as Malware C2 Proxies
好的,我现在需要帮用户总结一篇文章的内容,控制在100字以内。用户已经提供了文章的标题和内容,看起来是关于人工智能被用于恶意软件的指挥与控制(C2)的技术。 首先,我需要通读整篇文章,抓住主要信息。文章提到网络安全研究人员发现,支持网络浏览或URL获取功能的AI助手可以被转变为隐蔽的C2中继。这意味着攻击者可以利用这些AI工具混入合法的企业通信中,从而避开检测。 接下来,文章提到Check Point公司将这种攻击方法命名为AI作为C2代理,并且已经演示了针对Microsoft Copilot和xAI Grok的攻击。这种方法利用匿名网络访问结合浏览和总结提示,使得AI不仅可以作为C2中继,还可以辅助恶意软件的操作,比如生成侦察工作流程、编写攻击者动作脚本以及在入侵过程中动态决定下一步行动。 此外,文章还指出这种技术不需要API密钥或注册账户,因此传统的密钥撤销或账户封禁方法无效。攻击者需要先通过其他方式入侵机器并安装恶意软件,然后利用这些AI工具作为C2通道。 最后,文章还提到 Palo Alto Networks Unit 42展示了一种新型攻击技术,利用网页动态生成恶意JavaScript代码进行钓鱼攻击。 现在我需要将这些信息浓缩到100字以内。重点包括:AI助手被用于C2中继,Check Point的研究发现,无需API密钥或账户,攻击者利用这些工具进行隐蔽通信和恶意软件操作。 可能的结构是:网络安全研究人员发现AI助手可被用作隐蔽的C2中继,用于恶意软件操作和通信。无需API密钥或账户。Check Point研究显示其潜在威胁。 </think> 网络安全研究人员发现AI助手可被用作隐蔽的C2中继,用于恶意软件操作和通信,无需API密钥或账户,Check Point研究显示其潜在威胁. 2026-2-17 18:8:0 Author: thehackernews.com(查看原文) 阅读量:0 收藏

Malware / Artificial Intelligence

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed that artificial intelligence (AI) assistants that support web browsing or URL fetching capabilities can be turned into stealthy command-and-control (C2) relays, a technique that could allow attackers to blend into legitimate enterprise communications and evade detection.

The attack method, which has been demonstrated against Microsoft Copilot and xAI Grok, has been codenamed AI as a C2 proxy by Check Point.

It leverages "anonymous web access combined with browsing and summarization prompts," the cybersecurity company said. "The same mechanism can also enable AI-assisted malware operations, including generating reconnaissance workflows, scripting attacker actions, and dynamically deciding 'what to do next' during an intrusion."

The development signals yet another consequential evolution in how threat actors could abuse AI systems, not just to scale or accelerate different phases of the cyber attack cycle, but also leverage APIs to dynamically generate code at runtime that can adapt its behavior based on information gathered from the compromised host and evade detection.

AI tools already act as a force multiplier for adversaries, allowing them to delegate key steps in their campaigns, whether it be for conducting reconnaissance, vulnerability scanning, crafting convincing phishing emails, creating synthetic identities, debugging code, or developing malware. But AI as a C2 proxy goes a step further.

It essentially leverages Grok and Microsoft Copilot's web-browsing and URL-fetch capabilities to retrieve attacker-controlled URLs and return responses through their web interfaces, essentially transforming it into a bidirectional communication channel to accept operator-issued commands and tunnel victim data out.

Notably, all of this works without requiring an API key or a registered account, thereby rendering traditional approaches like key revocation or account suspension useless.

Viewed differently, this approach is no different from attack campaigns that have weaponized trusted services for malware distribution and C2. It's also referred to as living-off-trusted-sites (LOTS).

However, for all this to happen, there is a key prerequisite: the threat actor must have already compromised a machine by some other means and installed malware, which then uses Copilot or Grok as a C2 channel using specially crafted prompts that cause the AI agent to contact the attacker-controlled infrastructure and pass the response containing the command to be executed on the host back to the malware.

Check Point also noted that an attacker could go beyond command generation to make use of the AI agent to devise an evasion strategy and determine the next course of action by passing details about the system and validating if it's even worth exploiting.

"Once AI services can be used as a stealthy transport layer, the same interface can also carry prompts and model outputs that act as an external decision engine, a stepping stone toward AI-Driven implants and AIOps-style C2 that automate triage, targeting, and operational choices in real time, Check Point said.

The disclosure comes weeks after Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 demonstrated a novel attack technique where a seemingly innocuous web page can be turned into a phishing site by using client-side API calls to trusted large language model (LLM) services for generating malicious JavaScript dynamically in real time.

The method is similar to Last Mile Reassembly (LMR) attacks, which involves smuggling malware through the network via unmonitored channels like WebRTC and WebSocket and piecing them directly in the victim's browser, effectively bypassing security controls in the process.

"Attackers could use carefully engineered prompts to bypass AI safety guardrails, tricking the LLM into returning malicious code snippets," Unit 42 researchers Shehroze Farooqi, Alex Starov, Diva-Oriane Marty, and Billy Melicher said. "These snippets are returned via the LLM service API, then assembled and executed in the victim's browser at runtime, resulting in a fully functional phishing page."

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News, Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.


文章来源: https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/researchers-show-copilot-and-grok-can.html
如有侵权请联系:admin#unsafe.sh