njRAT runs MassLogger
好的,我现在需要帮用户总结一篇关于njRAT的文章,控制在100字以内。首先,我得通读文章内容,抓住主要信息。 文章主要讲的是njRAT这个远程访问木马,已经存在超过10年,仍然很流行。作者用NetworkMiner Professional来解码njRAT的C2流量,提取了截图、命令和传输的文件。比如,PCAP文件显示攻击者下载了受害者的全分辨率截图。还有njRAT的各种命令,比如CAP截图、inv调用DLL、rn运行可执行文件。此外,传输的文件是gzip压缩的,NetworkMiner可以提取出来。其中有一个CloudServices.exe是MassLogger恶意软件,用于窃取凭证并通过SMTP发送邮件。 用户的要求是总结内容在100字以内,并且不需要特定的开头。我需要提炼关键点:njRAT的功能、NetworkMiner的作用、提取的文件类型、MassLogger的作用以及IOC列表。 现在组织语言:njRAT是一种远程访问木马,已存在十年以上。文章展示了如何使用NetworkMiner Professional解码其C2流量,提取了截图、命令和传输的文件。这些文件包括DLL和EXE,并以gzip格式传输。其中CloudServices.exe是MassLogger恶意软件,用于窃取凭证并通过SMTP发送邮件。文章还提供了IOC列表。 检查字数是否在100字以内,并确保信息准确全面。 </think> njRAT是一种远程访问木马(RAT),已存在超过十年并仍被广泛使用。文章展示了如何通过NetworkMiner Professional解码njRAT的C2流量以提取截图、命令和传输文件。攻击者利用njRAT获取受害者屏幕全分辨率截图,并通过“inv”和“rn”命令传输DLL和EXE文件(以gzip压缩格式)。CloudServices.exe被识别为MassLogger恶意软件,用于窃取凭证并通过SMTP服务器发送数据。文章还提供了相关IOC列表以供参考。 2026-2-2 19:39:0 Author: securityboulevard.com(查看原文) 阅读量:0 收藏

njRAT

njRAT is a remote access trojan that has been around for more than 10 years and still remains one of the most popular RATs among criminal threat actors. This blog post demonstrates how NetworkMiner Professional can be used to decode the njRAT C2 traffic to extract artifacts like screenshots, commands and transferred files.

A PCAP file with njRAT traffic was published on malware-traffic-analysis.net last week. After loading this PCAP file, NetworkMiner Professional reveals that the attacker downloaded full resolution screenshots of the victim’s screen.

Overview of screenshots sent to C2 server

Image: Overview of screenshots sent to C2 server

Screenshot extracted from njRAT traffic by NetworkMiner

Image: Screenshot extracted from njRAT traffic by NetworkMiner

The file “New Purchase Order and Specifications.exe” in this screenshot is the njRAT binary that was used to infect the PC.

A list of njRAT commands sent from the C2 server to the victim can be viewed on NetworkMiner’s Parameters tab by filtering for ”njRAT server command”.

njRAT commands

The following njRAT commands are present here:

  • CAP = take screenshot
  • inv = invoke (run) a plugin (dll)
  • rn = run a tool (executable)

Additional njRAT commands can be found in our writeup for the Decoding njRAT traffic with NetworkMiner video, which we published last year.

njRAT File Transfers

The “inv” and “rn” commands both transfer and execute additional code on the victim machine. The “inv” command typically transfers a DLL file that is used as a plugin, while the “rn” commands sends an executable file. These DLL and EXE files are transferred in gzip compressed format, which is why NetworkMiner extracts them as .gz files.

njRAT files extracted from PCAP

Image: Gzip compressed files extracted from njRAT traffic

This oneliner command lists the internal/original file names and corresponding MD5 hashes of the gzip compressed executables sent to the victim PC:

  • for f in njRAT-rn*.gz; do echo $f; gunzip -c $f | exiftool – | grep Original; gunzip -c $f | md5sum; done
  • njRAT-rn-260129030403.gz
  • Original File Name : Stub.exe
  • ca819e936f6b913e2b80e9e4766b8e79 –
  • njRAT-rn-260129030433.gz
  • Original File Name : Stub.exe
  • e422a4ce321be1ed989008d74ddb6351 –
  • njRAT-rn-260129030451.gz
  • Original File Name : CloudServices.exe
  • fcbb7c0c68afa04139caa55efe580ff5 –
  • njRAT-rn-260129031041.gz
  • Original File Name : Stub.exe
  • 0ae3798c16075a9042c5dbb18bd10a5c –

The MD5 hashes of the files inside the gzip compressed streams can also be seen on the Parameters tab in NetworkMiner.

njRAT file MD5 hashes

MassLogger

The “CloudServices.exe” executable is a known credential stealer called MassLogger. This particular MassLogger sample is hard coded to exfiltrate data in an email to kingsnakeresult@mcnzxz[.]com. The email is sent through the SMTP server cphost14.qhoster[.]net. See the execution of this sample on Triage for additional details regarding the MassLogger payload in CloudServices.exe.

IOC List

njRAT

  • 58f1a46dba84d31257f1e0f8c92c59ec = njRAT sample
  • 104.248.130.195:7492 = njRAT C2 server
  • 801a5d1e272399ca14ff7d6da60315ef = sc2.dll
  • ca819e936f6b913e2b80e9e4766b8e79 = Stub.exe
  • e422a4ce321be1ed989008d74ddb6351 = Stub.exe
  • fcbb7c0c68afa04139caa55efe580ff5 = CloudServices.exe
  • 0ae3798c16075a9042c5dbb18bd10a5c = Stub.exe

MassLogger

  • fcbb7c0c68afa04139caa55efe580ff5
  • kingsnakeresult@mcnzxz[.]com
  • cphost14.qhoster.net:587
  • 78.110.166.82:587

*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from NETRESEC Network Security Blog authored by Erik Hjelmvik. Read the original post at: https://www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2026-02&post=njRAT-runs-MassLogger


文章来源: https://securityboulevard.com/2026/02/njrat-runs-masslogger/
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