Supply chain attack on eScan antivirus: detecting and remediating malicious updates
好的,我现在需要帮用户总结一篇文章的内容,控制在100个字以内。首先,我得仔细阅读文章,理解主要事件和关键点。 文章讲的是1月20日发生的一起供应链攻击事件,涉及印度公司MicroWorld Technologies的eScan杀毒软件。恶意软件通过eScan的更新服务器传播,导致了多阶段感染链。攻击者入侵了区域更新服务器,部署了恶意文件,并使用了伪造的数字签名。 同一天,安全解决方案检测并阻止了这次攻击。次日,开发者Morphisec介入,控制了事件。文章还提到用户如何检测感染和清除恶意软件的方法。 接下来,我需要将这些信息浓缩到100字以内。要抓住关键点:时间、公司、攻击方式、影响、应对措施等。 可能会遗漏一些细节,比如恶意软件的具体行为或后续分析,但这些可以适当简化或省略。 最后,确保语言简洁明了,直接描述事件。 </think> 1月20日,印度公司MicroWorld Technologies的eScan杀毒软件遭遇供应链攻击,恶意软件通过eScan更新服务器传播。攻击者入侵区域更新服务器并部署恶意文件。次日开发者Morphisec介入控制事件。用户需检查系统任务和hosts文件以检测感染,并使用工具清除恶意软件。 2026-1-29 15:7:35 Author: securelist.com(查看原文) 阅读量:0 收藏

Incidents

Incidents

minute read

On January 20, a supply chain attack has occurred, with the infected software being the eScan antivirus developed by an Indian company MicroWorld Technologies. The previously unknown malware was distributed through the eScan update server. The same day, our security solutions detected and prevented cyberattacks involving this malware. On January 21, having been informed by Morphisec, the developers of eScan contained the security incident related to the attack.

Malicious software used in the attack

Users of the eScan security product received a malicious Reload.exe file, which initiated a multi-stage infection chain. According to colleagues at Morphisec who were the first to investigate the attack, Reload.exe prevented further antivirus product updates by modifying the HOSTS file, thereby blocking the ability of security solution developers to automatically fix the problem, which, among other things, led to the update service error.

The malware also ensured its persistence in the system, communicated with control servers, and downloaded additional malicious payloads. Persistence was achieved by creating scheduled tasks; one example of such a malicious task is named CorelDefrag. Additionally, the consctlx.exe malicious file was written to the disk during the infection.

How the attackers managed to pull off this attack

At the request of the BleepingComputer information portal, eScan developers explained that the attackers managed to gain access to one of the regional update servers and deploy a malicious file, which was automatically delivered to customers. They emphasize that this is not a vulnerability — the incident is classified as unauthorized access to infrastructure. The malicious file was distributed with a fake invalid digital signature.

According to the developers, the infrastructure affected by the incident was quickly isolated, and all access credentials were reset.

How to stay safe?

To detect infection, it is recommended to review scheduled tasks for traces of malware, check the %WinDir%\System32\drivers\etc\hosts file for blocked eScan domains, and review the eScan update logs for January 20.

The developers of eScan have created a utility for their users that removes the malware, rolls back the modifications it has made, and restores the normal functionality of the antivirus. The utility is sent to customers upon request to technical support.

Users of the solution are also advised to block known malware control server addresses.

Kaspersky’s security solutions, such as Kaspersky Next, successfully detect all malware used by attackers with its Behavior Detection component.

Indicators of compromise

Several malicious domain names and links were listed in the Morphisec blog:

  • https://vhs.delrosal[.]net/i
  • https://tumama.hns[.]to
  • https://blackice.sol-domain[.]org
  • https://codegiant[.]io/dd/dd/dd.git/download/main/middleware.ts

Our experts have discovered additional network IoCs related to this attack:

  • https://airanks.hns[.]to
  • https://csc.biologii[.]net/sooc

Right now we are analyzing the malware used in this incident, and will post more details as soon as possible.

  • Reports

    Kaspersky researchers analyze updated CoolClient backdoor and new tools and scripts used in HoneyMyte (aka Mustang Panda or Bronze President) APT campaigns, including three variants of a browser data stealer.

    Kaspersky discloses a 2025 HoneyMyte (aka Mustang Panda or Bronze President) APT campaign, which uses a kernel-mode rootkit to deliver and protect a ToneShell backdoor.

    Kaspersky GReAT experts analyze the Evasive Panda APT’s infection chain, including shellcode encrypted with DPAPI and RC5, as well as the MgBot implant.

    Kaspersky expert describes new malicious tools employed by the Cloud Atlas APT, including implants of their signature backdoors VBShower, VBCloud, PowerShower, and CloudAtlas.


    文章来源: https://securelist.com/escan-supply-chain-attack/118688/
    如有侵权请联系:admin#unsafe.sh