Imagine a potential scenario that would keep security engineers up at night. An employee in your organization adheres to all the rules. The organization uses a 16-character complex password and multi-factor authentication for every account. They never approve a push notification they didn’t initiate, yet an attacker is currently browsing their corporate email, downloading files from the company’s SharePoint, and accessing the VPN.

How is this possible?

It wasn’t necessarily a phishing email targeting their work laptop.

Perhaps the employee logged in to their work dashboard on a shared home computer to check a quick status update over the weekend. Later that day, a family member used that same machine to download a game mod or a cracked utility.

In the background, for just a few seconds, an InfoStealer ran. It captured the browser state from that unmanaged personal device, including the active corporate sessions. The result? Corporate access is compromised, bypassing your firewalls and endpoint protection, often via a device you don’t even manage.

It’s Not Malware; It’s an Export Tool

For years, the industry has treated InfoStealers (such as RedLine, Vidar, or Lumma) as merely another category of malware. We scan for them, delete them, and reset the user’s password, yet this response fundamentally misunderstands the threat.

An InfoStealer is not designed to destroy your system; it is intended to steal your data.

When a machine is infected, the malware creates a precise digital clone of the user. It grabs the session cookies that prove you are already logged in (bypassing MFA). It holds the browser fingerprint that tells Google or Okta, “This is a trusted device.” It grabs the files on your desktop that contain your most sensitive projects.

The Industrialization of Identity Theft

This article is not just about the malware code. It is about the massive, sophisticated economy that moves this data from a victim’s computer to a criminal’s hands.

We are going to look beyond the “virus” and explore the ecosystem:

The Supply Chain: How “Traffers” infect millions of devices without writing a single line of code.

The Product: Why a “Log” is worth infinitely more than a “Credential.”

The Marketplace: How your digital identity is packaged, sold, and resold in the “Clouds” of Telegram.

Welcome to the hidden economy of Log Trafficking.

The Anatomy of a Log: It’s Not Just passwords.txt

When we talk about “stealer logs,” we are referring to two very different products circulating in the underground economy. If you enter a public Telegram channel today, you will see two distinct formats being distributed: the ULP and the Full Log.

Understanding the difference is key to understanding the risk.

Type A: The ULP (User:Link:Pass) — The “Fast Food” of Cybercrime

ULP stands for User:Link:Pass. These are massive text files, often containing millions of lines, formatted simply as: username:url:password

What it is: This is the “processed” version of stolen data. Traffers or automated bots take raw logs, strip away the heavy files (cookies, system info), and extract only the credentials. They then compile these into a single, massive list.

The Risk Profile:

· Volume: These files contain millions of credentials.

· Use Case: Attackers use these for Credential Stuffing or brute-force attack campaigns. They load these lists into automated checkers (such as OpenBullet) to identify which users reused their Netflix passwords on their Corporate VPN.

· Limitation: It is “dumb” data. It lacks context. If the target has 2FA/MFA enabled, a ULP entry is often useless.

Type B: The Full Log — The “Digital Clone”

This is the premium product. It is not a text line; it is a zipped folder containing the entire state of the infected machine. While the ULP provides a password, the Full Log provides the identity.

The Anatomy of a Full Log:

The Golden Ticket: Session Cookies

This file is the crown jewel. It contains the active session tokens for every site the victim was logged into at the moment of infection.

· Why it matters: Modern authentication minimizes friction. Once you log in with MFA, the server places a session cookie in your browser. InfoStealers export these cookies.

· The Attack: An attacker imports this file into their browser. The website recognizes a valid session token and grants immediate access, bypassing the password and MFA prompts.

The Digital Doppelgänger: System Information

Sophisticated security platforms (like Okta or Gmail) check for “impossible travel” or new devices. To defeat this, Full Logs include a detailed device fingerprint:

· IP Address & Geolocation

· Screen Resolution & Hardware IDs

· User-Agent Strings

· List of Installed Software

The Treasure Hunt: File Grabbers

Finally, the stealer hunts for specific files on the local disk. It uses “Grabber” rules to scan the Desktop and Documents folders for:

· Crypto: wallet.dat, “seed phrase.txt”

· Corporate: .ovpn (VPN configs), .rdp (Remote Desktop files), id_rsa (SSH keys).

· Secrets: Files named “passwords”, “contracts”, or “invoices”.

The Verdict: Access vs. Exposure

A ULP allows an attacker to knock on a million doors, hoping one is unlocked.

A Full Log is far more invasive. It doesn’t just provide access; it provides a psychological profile. By analyzing the History.txt (browsing habits), InstalledSoftware.txt, and Processes.txt, an attacker can reconstruct the victim’s entire life. They can see the victim’s location, their daily routine, their sexual preferences, and even their “password logic” (how they construct passwords for different sites).

An attacker with a Full Log doesn’t just steal an account; they understand the person behind the screen better than the security team defending them.

The Players: Who is Actually Stealing the Data?

To defend against InfoStealers, you must understand who you are fighting. The popular image of a “hacker” is a lone individual who writes code, finds a target, and breaches it.

In the world of InfoStealers, this is rarely the case. The ecosystem operates like a legitimate software corporation, with distinct departments for Engineering, Sales, and Marketing.

The Developer

At the top of the pyramid sits the Developer. They create the malware brands you see in threat intel reports (e.g., RedLine, Vidar, Lumma, Raccoon). Their job is purely technical: updating code to bypass AV/EDRs and maintaining the Command & Control (C2) infrastructure.

Crucially, the Developer does not infect victims. They operate on a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model, renting access to their “Panel” for a monthly subscription.

The Traffer

The real threat to your organization comes from the Traffers. These are the “marketers” of the cybercrime world. They often do not know how to code; they know how to generate traffic.

Traffers join organized “Teams” and use social engineering to trick millions of users into running the malware. Their methods are purely volume-based:

· YouTube SEO Poisoning: Uploading thousands of videos titled “Adobe Photoshop Free Crack 2025” or “FIFA 24 Cheat Engine” with a malicious link in the description.

· Malvertising: Buying legitimate Google/Facebook Ads for keywords like “Download OBS” or “Notion for Desktop” that lead to cloned phishing sites.

· Software Repackaging: Uploading infected versions of legitimate utility tools to torrent sites.

The “Gaming Vector” (Targeting the Want)

Traffers have industrialized the infection process by targeting users’ desire for premium features.

In a recent analysis of over 50,000 infected devices, a staggering trend was found:

· 41% of all infections originated from gaming-related files.

· Top Lures: The majority were disguised as unofficial mods or cheats for popular titles such as GTA, Roblox, Valorant, CS:GO, and Fortnite.

· Specific Hooks: Over half of these gaming infections came from users actively searching for “mod menus,” “wallhacks,” “aimbots,” and “skin swappers.”

The psychology here is simple but devastating. There is a gap between what players want (competitive advantage, premium skins) and what they are willing to pay for. Traffers exploit this gap, offering free “enhancements” that serve as the perfect cover for malware.

The “Worker” Bot

To scale this, Traffers use automation. They rarely touch the files manually:

1. The Traffer requests a build from a Telegram Worker Bot.

2. The bot generates a unique .exe (often FUD — Fully Undetectable).

3. The Traffer posts this file on YouTube tutorials (“Free Robux 2025”) or Discord servers.

4. When a victim runs the “cheat,” the log is sent to the Team’s panel and automatically forwarded back to the Traffer.

This separation of duties is why InfoStealers are so prolific. The Developer focuses on the code, and thousands of Traffers concentrate on the “Game Cheat” economy.

The Log Economy: The Journey of Stolen Data (Distribution)

The distribution of stolen data moved from static, hard-to-reach marketplaces to high-velocity, real-time streams. While traditional dark web forums still play a role, the modern ecosystem is defined by speed and accessibility, primarily driven by Telegram.

Telegram & The “Follow the River” Effect

There is a common misconception that obtaining stolen data requires elite access to exclusive, invite-only dark web forums. The reality is far simpler and more alarming: anyone can find these logs on Telegram.

You do not need special permissions; you need to “follow the river.”

The ecosystem relies heavily on cross-promotion — finding one channel inevitably leads to 5–10 others, as admins aggressively market each other’s services. Furthermore, rival channels frequently “leak” competitors’ paid logs to undermine them. Savvy users look at the filenames of these leaked archives (which often bear the original channel’s name) to discover and join the source.

Public Channels: Often used as marketing tools, these channels dump massive quantities of “public” logs — sometimes for free — to build reputation. In the last 10 months alone, we have obtained over 5 billion credentials by monitoring these public sources.

Private “Clouds”: For serious buyers, the real trade happens in private, paid-access channels known as “Clouds.” These act as subscription services, allowing multiple users to access the same stream of incoming logs.

Pricing Models: The Cost of Access

Access to these private “Cloud” channels is standardized, operating on a subscription model similar to legitimate SaaS products. A typical pricing structure for a high-quality private channel (where logs are shared among subscribers) looks like this:

1 Week: $180

1 Month: $300

Lifetime: $1,200

“One-Hand” Selling

There is a premium market for exclusivity. Sellers offer logs sold “to one hand only,” guaranteeing that no other criminal has purchased those specific credentials. This exclusivity commands the highest prices, as it ensures the buyer has the element of surprise — the victim’s organization hasn’t yet been alerted by other attackers trying to log in simultaneously.

Geography is King

The price and demand for logs are heavily dictated by the victim’s location (GEO).

Tier 1 (USA): The most expensive and sought-after category. The US market implies higher purchasing power and a greater likelihood of finding high-value corporate credentials or high-limit financial accounts.

Tier 2 (EU): European logs are valuable and sit close to US pricing levels, but are often slightly lower in demand.

Tier 3 (MIX/Global): This includes the rest of the world. While generally cheaper, clever attackers know that “Global” logs are increasingly valuable for Initial Access. As businesses globalize, a Fortune 500 company’s initial breach point is just as likely to be a remote employee’s device in India or Latin America as it is a workstation in New York.

Defense Strategy: Adapting to the Threat

With over 5 billion credentials leaking through Telegram channels in just 10 months, and the “Gamer” vector bypassing traditional corporate firewalls (often via personal devices), the old defense models are obsolete. We cannot simply rely on blocking malicious websites; we must assume that credentials will be compromised.

Defense must now operate on three fronts: Identity Hardening, Proactive Intelligence, and the “Shadow Gaming” Reality.

Identity Hardening: Killing the “Cookie” Attack

Infostealers are devastating because they steal Session Cookies, allowing attackers to bypass standard Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). If an attacker has your active cookie, they are you.

· Shortened Session Lifetimes: Reduce the window of opportunity. If a session token expires in 1 hour rather than 30 days, a stolen log becomes worthless very quickly.

· Strict Conditional Access: Implement “Impossible Travel” and IP-based restrictions. If a valid session cookie suddenly appears from a residential IP address in Russia while the employee is based in New York, the session should be revoked immediately.

Proactive Intelligence: Monitoring “The River”

As mentioned, the distribution of logs on Telegram is fast and voluminous. You cannot defend against what you don’t see.

· Automated Telegram Monitoring: Security teams must treat Telegram not as a chat app, but as a critical threat intelligence feed. Automated tools should scrape public channels and private “clouds” for corporate domains (e.g., @yourcompany.com).

· Rapid Remediation: The moment a corporate credential appears in a “log drop,” automated workflows should trigger immediate password resets and session revocations.

· Strategic Usage: For a deeper dive into how organisations can leverage this harvested data to improve their security posture, check out my analysis, Silent Threats: Strategic Insights — Harnessing Info-Stealer Data for Better Decisions.

Addressing “Shadow Gaming” and BYOD

The blur between work and play is the primary entry point. If a remote employee installs a cracked version of GTA V on the same laptop they use for work (or accesses work cloud apps from their infected personal gaming rig), the perimeter is breached.

· Enterprise Browser Profiles: Enforce the use of managed browser profiles (e.g., Chrome Enterprise, Edge for Business) for all work access. This ensures that even if the personal side of the browser is infected with malicious extensions or data, the work data remains segmented.

· The “Crack” Policy: Security awareness training needs to be specific. Instead of generic “don’t click links” advice, explicitly address the risks of pirated software, game mods, and “trainers.” Employees need to understand that “free” software often costs the company its entire network.

· Endpoint Detection (EDR) Tuning: Tune EDR tools to flag known gaming cheats and “activator” tools (like KMSPico) not just as “Potential Unwanted Programs” (PUPs), but as Critical Alerts, as they are now confirmed precursors to infostealer infections.

Conclusion: The Game Has Changed

For security leaders, the lesson is stark: The “Shadow IT” of 2025 is not an unapproved SaaS app; it is the employee’s personal gaming rig.

If your defense strategy relies on employees never making a mistake on their personal devices, you have already lost. The blurred lines between work and play in a remote-first world mean that corporate security is now inextricably linked to consumer behavior. To survive this shift, we must move beyond blocking and training. We must assume the device is compromised, harden the identity that resides on it, and proactively hunt for our data in the river of logs flowing through the underground.

The game has changed. It’s time our defenses stopped playing by the old rules.