Webshells Hiding in .well-known Places, (Thu, Sep 25th)
文章指出honeypots监测到针对.well-known目录的文件请求,攻击者试图寻找隐藏的webshell以避免更新覆盖,并列举了常见请求的URL。 2025-9-25 14:24:49 Author: isc.sans.edu(查看原文) 阅读量:9 收藏

Ever so often, I see requests for files in .well-known recorded by our honeypots. As an example:

GET /.well-known/xin1.php?p
Host: [honeypot host name]

The file names indicate that they are likely looking for webshells. In my opinion, the reason they are looking in .well-known is that this makes a decent place to hide webshells without having them overwritten by an update to the site.

The .well-known directory is meant to be used for various informational files [1], and for example, for ACME TLS challenges. As a result, it is the only directory or file starting with "." that must be accessible via the web server. But it is also "hidden" to Unix command line users. I have written about the various legitimate users of .well-known before [2]. 

We also see some requests for PHP files in the acme-challenge subdirectory, as well as the pki-challenge subdirectory:

Here are some of the more common, but not "standard" URLs in .well-known hit in our honeypots:

/.well-known/pki-validation/about.php
/.well-known/about.php
/.well-known/acme-challenge/cloud.php
/.well-known/acme-challenge/about.php
/.well-known/pki-validation/xmrlpc.php
/.well-known/acme-challenge/index.php

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8615
[2] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/26564

 --
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
Twitter|image of an http request to .well-known/xin1.php?p


文章来源: https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/32320
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