Unit 42 is tracking high-impact, ongoing threat activity targeting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint servers. While cloud environments remain unaffected, on-premises SharePoint deployments — particularly within government, schools, healthcare (including hospitals) and large enterprise companies — are at immediate risk.
CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771 are a set of vulnerabilities that impact Microsoft SharePoint. When chained together, they can allow unauthenticated threat actors to access functionality that's normally restricted, to run arbitrary commands on vulnerable instances of Microsoft SharePoint.
In addition to the CVE reports, Microsoft has released further guidance on these vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities, their CVSS scores and their descriptions are detailed in Table 1.
CVE # | Description | CVSS Score |
CVE-2025-49704 | Improper control of generation of code (code injection) in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. | 8.8 |
CVE-2025-49706 | Improper authentication in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. | 6.3 |
CVE-2025-53770 | Deserialization of untrusted data in on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. | 9.8 |
CVE-2025-53771 | Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (patd traversal) in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an authorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. | 6.3 |
Table 1. List of recent vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft SharePoint.
These vulnerabilities all apply to Microsoft SharePoint Enterprise Server 2016 and 2019. CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-53770 also apply to Microsoft SharePoint Server Subscription Edition. Microsoft has stated that SharePoint Online in Microsoft 365 is not impacted.
We are currently working closely with the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) to ensure that our customers have the latest information and we are actively notifying affected customers and other organizations. This situation is evolving rapidly, so it’s advisable to check Microsoft’s recommendations frequently.
We have observed active exploitation of these SharePoint vulnerabilities. Attackers are bypassing identity controls, including multi-factor authentication (MFA) and single sign-on (SSO), to gain privileged access. Once inside, they’re exfiltrating sensitive data, deploying persistent backdoors and stealing cryptographic keys.
The attackers have leveraged these vulnerabilities to get into systems and in some cases are already establishing their foothold. If you have SharePoint on-premises exposed to the internet, you should assume that you have been compromised. Patching alone is insufficient to fully evict the threat.
We are urging organizations who are running vulnerable on-premises SharePoint to take the following actions immediately:
Palo Alto Networks also recommends following Microsoft’s patching or mitigation guidance. CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771.
Additional guidance for CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771.
Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected from these vulnerabilities in the following ways:
Vulnerabilities Discussed | CVE-2025-49704,CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770, CVE-2025-53771 |
CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706 are a critical set of vulnerabilities that impact Microsoft SharePoint, allowing unauthenticated threat actors to access functionality that's normally restricted. When chained together, they allow an attacker to run arbitrary commands on vulnerable instances of Microsoft SharePoint.
Active attacks are targeting on-premises SharePoint Server customers by exploiting a variant of CVE-2025-49706. This new variant has been assigned CVE-2025-53770. Microsoft has also announced a fourth SharePoint vulnerability assigned CVE-2025-53771.
What makes these vulnerabilities especially concerning is SharePoint’s deep integration with Microsoft’s platform, including their services like Office, Teams, OneDrive and Outlook, which have significant information that’s valuable to attackers. A compromise in this situation doesn’t stay contained, it opens the door to the entire network.
Unit 42, and other organizations including Microsoft, have observed widespread active exploitation of these vulnerabilities.
Unit 42 Managed Threat Hunting Team has identified three different variations of exploitation activity, as early as July 17.
In this variation, we observed a command execution of a command shell invoking a PowerShell command. It attempted to iterate through web.config files on the endpoint and store the contents of those files into a file named debug_dev.js.
Figure 1 shows the commands observed.
The commands shown in Figure 1 perform the following actions:
In another variation, we observed the IIS Process Worker (w3wp.exe) invoking a command shell to execute a Base64-encoded PowerShell command shown below in Figure 2.
The command noted in Figure 2 creates a file at C:\PROGRA~1\COMMON~1\MICROS~1\WEBSER~1\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\spinstall0.aspx and then decodes the contents of the Base64 string contained at variable, $base64string, to the file. The spinstall0.aspx file is a web shell that can execute various functions to retrieve ValidationKeys, DecryptionKeys and the CompatabilityMode of the server, which are needed to forge ViewState Encryption keys.
Figure 3 shows the content of the spinstall0.aspx file created by the command from Figure 2.
This variation is almost identical to Variation 2, but with a few minor differences:
Figure 4 below shows an example of this variation.
Palo Alto Networks and Unit 42 are working closely with the MSRC and recommend the following critical steps:
Palo Alto Networks also recommends following Microsoft’s patching or mitigation guidance:
See Microsoft’s additional guidance for CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771. Microsoft states that the update for CVE-2025-53770 includes more robust protections than the update for CVE-2025-49704. The update for CVE-2025-53771 includes more robust protections than the update for CVE-2025-49706.
The Unit 42 Managed Threat Hunting team continues to track any attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities across our customers, using Cortex XDR and the XQL queries below. Cortex XDR customers can also use these XQL queries to search for signs of exploitation.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 |
// Note: This query will only work on agents 8.7 or higher // Description: This query leverages DotNet telemetry to identify references to ToolPane.exe, and extracts fields to provide additional context. dataset = xdr_data | fields _time, agent_hostname, actor_effective_username, actor_process_image_name, actor_process_image_path, actor_process_command_line, dynamic_event_string_map, event_thread_context, event_type | filter event_type = ENUM.DOT_NET and actor_process_image_name = "w3wp.exe" and event_thread_context contains "ToolPane.aspx" // Extract the IIS application pool name from command line | alter IIS_appName = arrayindex(regextract(actor_process_command_line, "\-ap\s+\"([^\"]+)\""), 0) // Extract fields from the dynamic_string_string_map: // EventSrcIP - Logged IP address by the IIS server // RequestURI - The requested URL by the threat actor // Payload - time he decoded .NET payload from exploitation // Headers - HTTP request headers | alter EventSrcIP = trim(json_extract(dynamic_event_string_map, "$.27"), "\""), RequestURI = trim(json_extract(dynamic_event_string_map, "$.26"), "\""), Payload = trim(json_extract(dynamic_event_string_map, "$.30"), "\""), Headers = trim(json_extract(dynamic_event_string_map, "$.32"), "\"") // Extract the X-Forwarded-For headers from the Headers field in an attempt to identify the source of exploitation | alter x_forwarded_for_header = regextract(lowercase(Headers), "\|(?:client-ip|x-forwarded-for)\:((?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|[1-9])(?:\.(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9][0-9]|[0-9])){3})\|") | fields _time, agent_hostname, actor_effective_username, actor_process_image_path, actor_process_command_line, IIS_appName, dynamic_event_string_map, event_thread_context, EventSrcIP, x_forwarded_for_header, RequestURI, Payload, Headers |
// Description: This query identifies known file names and paths observed during exploitation dataset = xdr_data | fields _time, agent_hostname, causality_actor_process_image_name, actor_process_image_name, actor_process_command_line, action_file_name, action_file_path, action_file_sha256, event_type, event_sub_type | filter event_type = ENUM.FILE and event_sub_type in (ENUM.FILE_WRITE, ENUM.FILE_CREATE_NEW) and (lowercase(action_file_path) in ("c:\program files\common files\microsoft shared\web server extensions\16\template\layouts\spinstall0.aspx","c:\program files\common files\microsoft shared\web server extensions\15\template\layouts\spinstall0.aspx", "c:\program files\common files\microsoft shared\web server extensions\16\template\layouts\debug_dev.js") or lowercase(action_file_name) = "spinstall0.aspx") and lowercase(actor_process_image_name) = "powershell.exe" |
// Description: This query identifies the IIS Process Worker, w3wp invoking a command shell which executes a base64 encodedPowerShell command. This is not specific to the CVE, and may catch potential other post-exploitation activity. dataset = xdr_data | fields _time, agent_hostname, causality_actor_process_image_name, actor_process_image_name, actor_process_command_line, action_process_image_name, action_process_image_command_line , event_type, event_sub_type | filter event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START and lowercase(causality_actor_process_image_name) = "w3wp.exe" and lowercase(actor_process_image_name) = "cmd.exe" and lowercase(action_process_image_name) = "powershell.exe" and action_process_image_command_line ~= "(?:[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{4})*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{3}=|[A-Za-z0-9+\/]{2}={2})" |
Based on observations of in-the-wild exploitation and the ease and effectiveness of this exploit, Palo Alto Networks highly recommends following Microsoft’s guidance to protect your organization. Palo Alto Networks and Unit 42 will continue to monitor the situation for updated information.
Palo Alto Networks has shared our findings with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.
Palo Alto Networks customers are better protected by our products, as listed below. We will update this threat brief as more relevant information becomes available.
Palo Alto Networks customers can leverage a variety of product protections and updates to identify and defend against this threat.
If you think you might have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:
Cortex XDR agents version 8.7 with content version 1870-19884 (or 1880-19902) will block known exploitation activities related to the exploitation chain of CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706 and report known exploitation activities related to the chain of CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771.
Cortex Xpanse has the ability to identify exposed SharePoint devices on the public internet and escalate these findings to defenders. Customers can enable alerting internet-exposed SharePoint by ensuring that the SharePoint Server Attack Surface Rule is enabled. Identified findings can either be viewed in the Threat Response Center or in the incident view of Expander. These findings are also available for Cortex XSIAM customers who have purchased the ASM module.
Table 2 shows a list of indicators associated with SharePoint exploitation activity observed by Unit 42 and their description.
Indicator | Description |
107.191.58[.]76 | Exploitation source |
104.238.159[.]149 | Exploitation source |
96.9.125[.]147 | Exploitation source |
139.144.199[.]41 | Exploitation source |
89.46.223[.]88 | Exploitation source |
45.77.155[.]170 | Exploitation source |
95.179.158[.]42 | Exploitation source |
149.40.50[.]15 | Exploitation source |
154.223.19[.]106 | Exploitation source |
185.197.248[.]131 | Exploitation source |
149.40.50[.]15 | Exploitation source |
C:\PROGRA~1\COMMON~1\MICROS~1\WEBSER~1\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\spinstall0.aspx | File created after encoded command run |
C:\PROGRA~1\COMMON~1\MICROS~1\WEBSER~1\15\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\spinstall0.aspx | File created after encoded command run |
C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\Web Server Extensions\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\debug_dev.js | File created after PowerShell command run |
4A02A72AEDC3356D8CB38F01F0E0B9F26DDC5CCB7C0F04A561337CF24AA84030 | .NET module - initial hash observed |
B39C14BECB62AEB55DF7FD55C814AFBB0D659687D947D917512FE67973100B70 | .NET module |
FA3A74A6C015C801F5341C02BE2CBDFB301C6ED60633D49FC0BC723617741AF7 | .NET module - targeting ViewState |
390665BDD93A656F48C463BB6C11A4D45B7D5444BDD1D1F7A5879B0F6F9AAC7E | .NET module |
66AF332CE5F93CE21D2FE408DFFD49D4AE31E364D6802FFF97D95ED593FF3082 | .NET module |
7BAF220EB89F2A216FCB2D0E9AA021B2A10324F0641CAF8B7A9088E4E45BEC95 | .NET module |
Table 2. Indicators associated with SharePoint exploitation activity observed by Unit 42.