Executive Summary

On March 29, 2023, CrowdStrike released a blog discussing a supply chain attack involving a software-based phone application called 3CXDesktopApp. As of March 30, the 3CXDesktopApp installer hosted on the developer’s website will install the application with two malicious libraries included. The malicious libraries will ultimately run shellcode to load a backdoor on the system that allows actors to install additional malware on the victim machine.

At this time, we cannot determine exactly how these malicious libraries were included in the 3CXDesktopApp installer. We speculate that threat actors might have introduced these malicious libraries during the build process of the 3CXDesktopApp application. Because malicious content was added to this legitimate application in order to compromise the users of 3CXDesktopApp, it could suggest that this is intended to be a supply chain attack.

3CX products are widely used across the globe. Our Cortex Xpanse product was able to fingerprint 247,277 distinct IP addresses in 199 countries that are using 3CX applications.

Between March 9-30, 2023, we observed activity at 127 Cortex XDR customers that involved the 3CXDesktopApp process attempting to run shellcode, which was blocked by the XDR Agent’s In-process Shellcode Protection Module. Due to blocking the shellcode, we were unable to obtain the secondary payload used in this attack, so we cannot determine its capabilities or any post-exploitation activities carried out by the threat actor.

Table of Contents

Details of the Incident
Current Scope of the Attack
Interim Guidance
Unit 42 Managed Threat Hunting Queries
Conclusion
Palo Alto Networks Product Protections for 3CXDesktopApp Supply Chain Attack
Indicators of Compromise

Details of the Incident

The 3CXDesktopApp supply chain attack began with threat actors introducing malicious libraries into the legitimate 3CXDesktopApp installation application, likely by including these libraries during the build process of 3CXDesktopApp. With the malicious libraries included in the legitimate installer, individuals fall victim by downloading and running the 3CXDesktopApp installer from the developer’s website.

At the time of publishing this threat brief, the Unit 42 team is aware of malicious 3CXDesktopApp installers meant to run on both Windows and macOS. The former comes as a Windows Installer File (.msi) and the latter comes as an Apple Disk Image file (.dmg). Figure 1 shows a diagram of the overall process.

On a Windows system, the MSI installer extracts several files and runs 3CXDesktopApp.exe, which loads a malicious library file named ffmpeg.dll. This DLL was originally compiled on Nov. 12th, 2022, based on compiler metadata.

The ffmpeg.dll library reads in a second extracted library with a file name of d3dcompiler_47.dll, decrypts a portion of it using RC4 and a key of 3jB(2bsG#@c7, and runs the decrypted contents as shellcode. The shellcode loads an embedded DLL and calls the DllGetClassObject function exported by the DLL.

Once initially executed, the malware will generate a randomly selected date that is between 1-4 weeks in the future. This timestamp is then checked against the current time of the compromised machine, and the malware will sleep until that time is encountered. In doing so, this prevents the malware from executing for a significant amount of time, to prevent victims suspecting that the program was backdoored.

The DLL attempts to obtain its command and control (C2) server by downloading an icon file from the following URL whose filename includes a randomly generated number between 1 and 15:

hxxps://raw.githubusercontent[.]com/IconStorages/images/main/icon[1-15].ico

This request looks similar to the one below.

GET /IconStorages/images/main/icon1.ico HTTP/1.1
accept: */*
accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.9
accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, br
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) 3CXDesktopApp/18.11.1197 Chrome/102.0.5005.167 Electron/19.1.9 Safari/537.36
Host: raw.githubusercontent.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

The GitHub account above no longer exists; however, we were able to obtain the icon files that were hosted at the above URLs. Table 1 includes the hash of the icon file, the filename and the C2 URL extracted from within the file.

Table 1. Icon files hosted at GitHub account used by payload to locate C2 URL.

It should also be noted that the .ico files originally appeared on this GitHub repository Dec. 7th, 2022, as shown in the git logs in Figure 2 below. This provides additional insight into the timeline as to when this attack originated.

After the .ico files are downloaded, parsed and subsequently decrypted to extract the next stage URL, the malware will perform an HTTPS request to it. The requests are similar to the following:

GET /api/session HTTP/1.1
accept: */*
accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.9
accept-encoding: gzip, deflate, br
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) 3CXDesktopApp/18.11.1197 Chrome/102.0.5005.167 Electron/19.1.9 Safari/537.36
Host: officestoragebox.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache

While the remote C2 servers are no longer available, we can understand what the malware expects based on its own control flow. The C2 server is expected to respond with a JSON blob, containing the following keys.

{
“url” : [data],
“meta” : [data],
“description” : [data]
}

The “meta” field is parsed, and the data contained within this field is subsequently decrypted using the same routine that was previously leveraged. Finally, this decrypted data is directly executed on the victim machine.

Both of the known macOS variants involve DMG installers that contain a malicious FFmpeg library, specifically at the following path:

3CX Desktop App.app/Contents/Frameworks/Electron Framework.framework/Versions/A/Libraries/libffmpeg.dylib

This malicious library is similar in functionality but simpler than the Windows variant, as libffmpeg.dylib library does not attempt to obtain its C2 URL by extracting the URL from within an icon file hosted in a GitHub account. Instead, the Mac variant contains a list of 16 hardcoded URLs that it will communicate with as its C2 server, as seen in the following list:

• msstorageazure[.]com/analysis
• officestoragebox[.]com/api/biosync
• visualstudiofactory[.]com/groupcore
• azuredeploystore[.]com/cloud/images
• msstorageboxes[.]com/xbox
• officeaddons[.]com/quality
• sourceslabs[.]com/status
• zacharryblogs[.]com/xmlquery
• pbxcloudeservices[.]com/network
• pbxphonenetwork[.]com/phone
• akamaitechcloudservices[.]com/v2/fileapi
• azureonlinestorage[.]com/google/storage
• msedgepackageinfo[.]com/ms-webview
• glcloudservice[.]com/v1/status
• pbxsources[.]com/queue
• www.3cx[.]com/blog/event-trainings/

Note that the www.3cx[.]com URL above is a legitimate website owned by the 3CX vendor, which is not believed to be used for C2 communication at the time of writing.

The URLs found in the macOS variant use the same domains as the Windows variant, with the exception of the pbxphonenetwork[.]com domain. However, the URL paths differ between the macOS and Windows variants when interacting with the same domain.

CrowdStrike has publicly attributed this activity to a threat actor they track as Labyrinth Collima. While we cannot confirm the overlap that led to this attribution, we believe the use of the RC4 key of 3jB(2bsG#@c7 in this attack was seen in previous activity associated with Labyrinth Collima. Huntress Labs mentioned this key has been used in the past by DPRK threat actors, which suggests it could be the linkage to Labyrinth Collima. At this time, we cannot confirm or deny this overlap and will continue to look for attributable evidence.

Current Scope of the Attack

According to 3CX’s announcement, the supply chain attack involved the 3CX Electron Windows App shipped in Update 7, version numbers 18.12.407 and 18.12.416, and Electron Mac App version numbers 18.11.1213, 18.12.402, 18.12.407 and 18.12.416.

According to XDR and XSIAM telemetry, we observed activity at 127 customers that involved the 3CXDesktopApp process attempting to run shellcode, which was blocked by XDR Agent’s In-process Shellcode Protection Module. We observed 5,796 of these events across 1,832 unique systems between March 9-30, 2023.

Due to the blocking of the execution of the shellcode, we were unable to obtain the secondary payload of this attack that would contain the functionality needed by the threat actor to carry out any additional activities.

To determine the prevalence of 3CX products, we created a fingerprint of their publicly accessible applications and scanned the internet with our Xpanse product. The scan results showed 247,277 unique IP addresses in 199 countries that match this fingerprint, which suggests 3CX products are widely used at organizations across the globe.

Figure 3 shows a heatmap of the countries with IP address and TCP port combinations matching our fingerprint for 3CX products.

Interim Guidance

According to 3CX’s announcement, the vendor suggests customers use the company’s PWA product instead of the desktop application while the vendor updates the application. As of March 30, all of the C2 domain names and the GitHub repository hosting the icon files have been taken down. However, we suggest any system running the known malicious versions of 3CXDesktopApp investigate for compromise.

Unit 42 Managed Threat Hunting Queries

Conclusion

The 3CXDesktopApp supply chain attack has received significant attention, as these products are widely used, with at least 247,000 systems across the globe according to our Xpanse product. The compromised 3CXDesktopApp application was seen in the environments of 127 of our customers, and we blocked the execution of the malicious shellcode executed by the application via the XDR Agent’s In-process Shellcode Protection Module.

At this time, the malicious 3CXDesktopApp installers do not have any active C2 domains to communicate with. However, systems that have run the known compromised 3CXDesktopApp versions or communicated with any of the C2 URLs should be investigated for potential compromise.

Palo Alto Networks Product Protections for 3CXDesktopApp Supply Chain Attack

Palo Alto Networks customers can leverage a variety of product protections and updates to identify and defend against this threat.

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

• North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
• EMEA: +31.20.299.3130
• APAC: +65.6983.8730
• Japan: +81.50.1790.0200

Cortex XDR and XSIAM

In-process Shellcode Protection Module and Behavioral Threat Protection help protect against these attacks and they have blocked multiple attacks in-the-wild prior to any malicious execution.

Indicators of Compromise

Domains

• msstorageazure[.]com
• officestoragebox[.]com
• visualstudiofactory[.]com
• azuredeploystore[.]com
• msstorageboxes[.]com
• officeaddons[.]com
• sourceslabs[.]com
• zacharryblogs[.]com
• pbxcloudeservices[.]com
• pbxphonenetwork[.]com
• akamaitechcloudservices[.]com
• azureonlinestorage[.]com
• msedgepackageinfo[.]com
• glcloudservice[.]com
• pbxsources[.]com