This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese)

Executive Summary

LockBit 2.0 is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that first emerged in June 2021 as an upgrade to its predecessor LockBit (aka ABCD Ransomware), which was first observed in September 2019.

Since its inception, the LockBit 2.0 RaaS attracted affiliates via recruitment campaigns in underground forums, and thus became particularly prolific during the third quarter of calendar year 2021. The LockBit 2.0 operators claimed to have the fastest encryption software of any active ransomware strain as of June 2021, claiming accordingly that this added to its effectiveness and ability to disrupt the ransomware landscape.

While several top-tier RaaS affiliate programs, such as Babuk, DarkSide and REvil (aka Sodinokibi) disappeared from the underground in 2021, LockBit 2.0 continued to operate and gradually became one of the most active ransomware operations. While Conti was recognized as being the most prolific ransomware deployed in 2021 per our 2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report, LockBit 2.0 is the most impactful and widely deployed ransomware variant we have observed in all ransomware breaches during the first quarter of 2022, considering both leak site data and data from cases handled by Unit 42 incident responders.

According to data analysis of ransomware groups’ dark web leak sites, LockBit 2.0 was the most impactful RaaS for five consecutive months. As of May 25, LockBit 2.0 accounted for 46% of all ransomware-related breach events for 2022. And the LockBit 2.0 RaaS leak site has the most significant number of published victims, with over 850 in total.

Additionally, LockBit 2.0 has affected many companies globally, with top victims based in the U.S., Italy and Germany. Its most highly targeted industry verticals include professional services, construction, wholesale and retail, and manufacturing.

Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against LockBit 2.0 attacks from Cortex XDR, as well as from the WildFire cloud-delivered security subscription for the Next-Generation Firewall. (Please see the Conclusion section for more detail.)

Table of Contents

LockBit 2.0 Overview
Victimology
Leak Site Data
Unit 42 Incident Response Data on LockBit 2.0
LockBit 2.0 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
LockBit 2.0 Technical Details
LockBit 3.0
Courses of Action
Conclusion
Appendix A
Additional Resources

LockBit 2.0 Overview

LockBit 2.0 is another example of RaaS that leverages double extortion techniques as part of the attack to pressure victims into paying the ransom.

In some cases, LockBit 2.0 operators have performed DDoS attacks on the victims' infrastructure as well as using a leak site. This practice is known as triple extortion, a tactic observed in groups like BlackCat, Avaddon and SunCrypt in the past.

Like other ransomware families such as BlackByte, LockBit 2.0 avoids systems that use Eastern European languages, including many written with Cyrillic alphabets.

Unlike other RaaS programs that don't require the affiliates to be super technical or savvy, LockBit 2.0 operators allegedly only work with experienced penetration testers, especially those experienced with tools like Metasploit and Cobalt Strike. Affiliates are tasked with gaining initial access to the victim network, allowing LockBit 2.0 to conduct the rest of the attack.

LockBit 2.0 has been observed changing infected computers’ backgrounds to a ransomware note. The ransomware note was also used to recruit insiders from victim organizations. The notes claimed the threat actors would pay “millions of dollars” to insiders who provided access to corporate networks or facilitated a ransomware infection by opening a phishing email and/or launching a payload manually. The threat actors also expressed interest in other access methods such as RDP, VPN and corporate email credentials. In exchange, they offer a cut of the paid ransom.

Victimology

LockBit 2.0 targets organizations opportunistically. The operators work with initial access brokers to save time and allow for a larger profit potential. While typically seeking victims of opportunity, LockBit 2.0 does appear to have victim limitations. The group announced that they would not target healthcare facilities, social services, educational institutions, charitable organizations and other organizations that “contribute to the survival of the human race”. However, despite these claims, there have been instances of affiliates undermining these guidelines by still opting to attack industry verticals such as healthcare and education.

Organizations in Europe and the U.S. are hit more often by LockBit 2.0 than those in other countries, likely due to the high profitability and insurance payouts.

Leak Site Data

During the first calendar year quarter of 2022, LockBit 2.0 persisted as the most impactful and the most deployed ransomware variant we observed in all ransomware breaches shared on leak sites.

According to leak site data analysis, LockBit 2.0 was the most impactful RaaS for five consecutive months. As of May 25, LockBit 2.0 accounted for 46% of all ransomware-related breach events for 2022 shared on leak sites.

Additionally, the LockBit 2.0 RaaS leak site has the most significant number of published victims, with over 850 in total. The site itself typically features information such as victim domains, a time tracker and measures of how much data was compromised.

LockBit 2.0 claims that they have demanded ransom from at least 12,125 companies, as shown in the figure below.

According to leak site data for LockBit 2.0, since its inception in June 2021, the RaaS has affected many companies globally, with top victims based in the U.S., Italy and Germany.

LockBit 2.0 has also impacted various victims across multiple industry verticals. Its most highly targeted industry verticals include professional services, construction, wholesale and retail and manufacturing.

When looking at leak site data across all ransomware families, we’ve observed LockBit 2.0 targeting the highest number of organizations in the following regions: JAPAC, EMEA, and LATAM.

Unit 42 Incident Response Data on LockBit 2.0

Cases handled by Unit 42 security consultants involving LockBit 2.0 since its appearance in June 2021 demonstrate shorter dwell times and less flexibility in negotiation in the beginning of FY 2022 (measured October-September) in comparison to the end of FY 2021. The following data is broken into fiscal years and quarters based on when the threat actor breached the network, not when the activity was noticed by a client.

LockBit 2.0 has shown a decrease in dwell time in FY 2022. From the last two quarters of FY 2021 to the first two quarters of FY 2022, there has been an average 37-day difference.

The difference in initial and final ransom demands over the past fiscal year has been converted to percentages and then averaged. The graph below demonstrates that at the end of FY 2021, threat actors using LockBit 2.0 were much more open to negotiations of ransom amounts; during that time the ransom was dropped approximately 83% from the initial ask on average. In comparison, we see less flexibility in FY 2022 Q1 and Q3 – threat actors only offered an average of about 30% as a price drop. FY 2022 Q2 is not included due to lack of sufficient information.

LockBit 2.0 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

Technically speaking, we have observed LockBit 2.0 affiliates leveraging the following tactics, techniques and procedures:

LockBit 2.0 Technical Details

LockBit 2.0 was developed using the Assembly and Origin C programming languages and leverages advanced encryption standard (AES) and elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) algorithms to encrypt victim data. It can affect both Windows and Linux OS, as the operator released a Linux version of LockBit 2.0 to target VMware ESXi hypervisor systems in October 2021, coded exclusively in the C programming language.

The LockBit group claimed that LockBit 2.0 is “the fastest encryption software all over the world” and provided a comparative table showing the encryption speed of various ransomware samples.

LockBit 2.0 also contains a self-spreading feature, clears logs and can print the ransom note on network printers until the paper runs out.

A management panel that affiliates can use to manage victims and affiliate accounts, generate new ransomware builds and generate the decryptor if the demanded ransom is paid also exists.

LockBit 2.0 operators also released an information-stealer dubbed StealBit, which was developed to support affiliates of the LockBit 2.0 RaaS when exfiltrating data from breached companies.

StealBit contains the following capabilities:

• Operates as a file grabber and dumps/uploads victim data to the LockBit victim-shaming site.
• No reliance on third-party cloud file-sharing services, where data can be easily removed if the victim submitted a complaint.
• The download speed is limited only by internet connection bandwidth, so it is possible to clone folders from corporate networks and upload them to the LockBit victim shaming blog quickly.

The operator of LockBit 2.0 has provided a comparative table speed showing the information stealer compared to other tools.

LockBit 3.0

There was a bug that existed in LockBit 2.0 that allowed researchers to revert the encryption process on an MSSQL database. After the bug’s disclosure, LockBit forum members discussed how the bug will not exist in LockBit’s next iteration. Moreover, on March 17, LockBit forum members mentioned the release of LockBit’s next version in one or two weeks. On March 25, VX underground posted a tweet with details of this new version, dubbed LockBit Black.

Courses of Action

Several adversarial techniques were observed in this activity and the following measures are suggested within Palo Alto Networks products and services to ensure mitigation of threats related to LockBit 2.0 ransomware, as well as other malware using similar techniques:

†These capabilities are part of the NGFW security subscriptions service
Note: This is not an all-inclusive list of the protections provided by Palo Alto Networks. This is a subset of our current Courses of Action initiative and will be updated as the project progresses.

Conclusion

LockBit 2.0 and its evolution over time is a perfect example to illustrate the persistence, increasing complexity and impact brought by the ransomware landscape as a whole. With claims of this RaaS offering the fastest encryption on the ransomware market, coupled with the fact that it has been delivered in high volume by experienced affiliates, this RaaS poses a significant threat. LockBit’s continuation with operations and its next iteration coming up on the horizon means that organizations and their security teams need to stay vigilant in the ever-evolving threat landscape.

Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents LockBit 2.0 ransomware in the following ways:

• WildFire: All known samples are identified as malware.
• Cortex XDR:
  • Identifies indicators associated with LockBit 2.0.
  • Anti-Ransomware Module to detect LockBit 2.0 encryption behaviors on Windows.
  • Local Analysis detection for LockBit 2.0 binaries on Windows.
• Next-Generation Firewalls: DNS Signatures detect the known C2 domains, which are also categorized as malware in Advanced URL Filtering.

If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:

• North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42)
• EMEA: +31.20.299.3130
• APAC: +65.6983.8730
• Japan: +81.50.1790.0200

Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members. CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors. Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.

Appendix A

In August 2021, a Russian blogger published a 22-minute interview with an alleged representative of the group behind LockBit 2.0 called “LockBitSupp” on a YouTube channel called “Russian-language open source intelligence (OSINT).” The same Russian blogger previously published interviews with a representative of the group behind the REvil ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), hackers and security experts.

Some key takeaways from the claims made in the interview were:

• The LockBit 2.0 threat actor claimed the group’s RaaS was unlikely to be rebranded since the team allegedly was a business that was honest with their customers – suggesting a supposed contrast between LockBit 2.0 and Avaddon, DarkSide and REvil affiliates.
• The LockBit 2.0 ransomware disregarded keyboard layout, but it allegedly would not run on a host where the system language was set to any of the languages spoken in the Commonwealth of Independent States region.
• The group did not devise attacks on companies of their choice; they simply worked with initial access to any corporate network they obtained elsewhere, since this was more profitable and saved time. The team selected targets for ransomware attacks based on the company’s finances — the bigger, the better. The location also did not matter. However, team members allegedly did not attack healthcare facilities, social services, educational institutions and charitable organizations or any other organization that “contributed to the survival of the human race.” [Note that Unit 42 case data does include indications that threat actors using LockBit 2.0 have targeted healthcare organizations at times.]
• The threat actor claimed that the largest number of victims who paid ransom were company representatives who did not care about creating backup copies and did not protect their sensitive data. According to the threat actor’s claims, companies that violated regulations about collecting and handling customer or user personal information were among those eager to pay. The threat actor claimed that there generally were only a few companies who refused to pay ransom on principle, while most of the victims evaluated profit and loss to decide whether or not to pay a ransom.
• LockBit 2.0 operators allegedly almost always offered discounts to their victims since the goal was to streamline attacks.
• The threat actor claimed that the COVID-19 pandemic facilitated ransomware attacks significantly, saying it was easy to compromise home computers of employees who work remotely and use them as a springboard to access other networked systems.
• Companies in Europe and the U.S. were hit with ransomware much more often than companies based in other countries allegedly because of high profit and insurance and not because of language barriers.
• Ransomware operators usually recruit negotiators, who coerce victims to pay ransom, since professional penetration testers allegedly lack the time for chatter.

Additional Resources

LockBit 3.0: Another Upgrade to the World’s Most Active Ransomware
Ransomware Groups to Watch: Emerging Threats
Average Ransom Payment Up 71% This Year, Approaches $1 Million
2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report Highlights